Brian M Downing
Over the last three years Saudi Arabia has devoted considerable diplomatic and financial resources into dual efforts in the Middle East: thwarting democracy and opposing Iranian-Shia influence. Riyadh has financed militant groups, strategically manipulated fiscal and oil subsidies, and trained students in zealous militancy to serve in various conflicts. All the while, Riyadh has remained confident that its geographic distance, internal security networks, and lavishly equipped armed forces can prevent adverse repercussions from reaching the Kingdom. This, however, may be an illusion.
Saudi foreign policy
After the Muslim Brotherhood won the presidency in Egypt, Saudi Arabia withheld financial support and oil deliveries, weakening the frail economy and undermining the new government. The Egyptian army, a key part of the old Mubarak oligarchy, was encouraged to oust the Muslim Brotherhood from the presidency and indeed from the entire political system. Once they did so, Saudi support magnanimously returned. So did the Egyptian oligarchy, though not magnanimously. Their president ousted from power, their leadership imprisoned, their colleagues shot down, many Muslim Brotherhood supporters will turn to vengeful splinter groups. Scores of kindred groups already thrive in nearby Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Egyptian recruits will eagerly train there in marksmanship and bomb-making before turning their attention to the powers that ousted their president and thwarted their chance for democracy.
When demonstrations began to sweep Syria in 2011, Saudi emissaries visited President Assad to offer support in exchange for breaking with Iran. Riyadh here was pursuing its two goals in a single diplomatic effort: thwarting democracy and reducing Iranian influence. Assad rejected the overture, demonstrations became armed uprisings, and Saudi Arabia began supporting rebel militias who have fragmented Syria into numerous warlord fiefs with disparate foreign suzerains.
Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Riyadh warned the Bush administration that ousting Saddam would lead to a Shia government allied with Tehran. This proved to be an astute if somewhat overstated observation. Riyadh has since tried to weaken the Shia government in Baghdad by supporting various Sunni political and military groups, many of them violent. In recent years, the Sunni opposition has become reacquainted with al Qaeda – a group it allied with after Saddam was ousted but broke with during the short-lived Sunni Awakening. Support from the Saudi state is uncertain but Saudi individuals continue to fund sectarian militants in Iraq.
The Saudi military is too small and bereft of fighting spirit to take on the larger and better disciplined armed forces of Iran. Accordingly, Riyadh has supported proxies such as the Jundullah and perhaps Jaish ul-Adl to strike inside Iran. It has also supported Mossad/Mujahideen-e Khalq assassinations and bombings and aggressively lobbied for the US to destroy Iran’s nuclear installations at Natanz, Fordo, and Parchin.
Aside from specific theaters of operation, the Saudis also support madrasas and Salafi networks that motivate youths eager to go into battle somewhere in the Islamic world, from Mali to Kashmir, in groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. Riyadh sees them as useful in its religious and political goals for the region, however for many former students the cause is more sweeping than the Saudi elders realize and they may turn their attention on their benefactors whom they see as limited in faith and vision.
The war comes home
These polices will bring consequences to the Kingdom – perhaps destabilizing ones. First, sectarian conflict has existed through much of the Middle East for centuries but it has flared to fearsome levels in the last two years in no small part due to Saudi sponsorship of anti-Shia militant groups in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan. There are approximately 2.5 million Shias in Saudi Arabia (about ten percent of the population), concentrated in the oil-rich eastern region. They have been excluded from employment and education opportunities and their protests have been quashed by fatwas and security police. They now see their brethren abroad killed in the thousands from their government’s actions. Attempts to preempt such opposition through oppression and deportation will only deepen Shia hostility and make an insurgency all the more likely.
Second, young Saudis, eager for internal reform and disinterested in sectarian outlooks, view their doddering leadership as a force of political reaction and religious intolerance. The House of Saud’s assistance in ousting the elected government of Egypt and in fueling anti-Shia passions throughout the region augur poorly for a transition to a more liberal government. Younger Saudis, including increasingly vocal women, will conclude that more aggressive action is essential for political change at home.
Third, and paradoxically, the Saudis face opposition from their own religious right. Saudi elders do not always practice what they preach and are hence vulnerable to charges of decadence and western ways. There has long been concern over the presence of western forces inside the Kingdom, often not far from Mecca and Medina. Allegedly sent away ten years ago, western forces never entirely left and indeed US troops are growing in numbers at the Prince Sultan Airbase from which drones fly over Yemen.
Recent reports of Israeli planes being authorized to use Saudi airspace to attack Iran will further anger pious Saudis. Danger stems from three conservative groups: Wahabbi clerics who oppose the government’s reforms (limited though they are), tribes on the periphery ever suspicious of urban elites, and returning jihadis who see the faith and determination they displayed in battle lacking in the political elite.The Pakistani government has long encouraged Sunni extremism to fight foreign enemies and now faces a fearsome blowback as their students attack their teachers and benefactors. The Saudis may soon face similar blowback.
Succession and international context
These sectarian, geopolitical, generational, and conservative forces are building simultaneously and at an auspicious moment in the Kingdom’s relatively brief history. The House of Saud is managed by a clique of aged men, the sons of the warrior-king Abdul Aziz, who seek to pass on power to a younger clique. Further, an IMF study sees the Saudi coffers disbursing more than they take in within a few years, making stability-through-subsidy less likely – all the more so as Saudi funds are increasingly allocated (or misallocated) to geopolitical ambitions in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
Two powerful regional actors in the region, Israel and Iran, though deeply antagonistic at present, may see advantages in aiding the disparate Saudi opposition and in destabilizing if not fragmenting the Kingdom, placing it in the same woeful ranks of disintegrating states as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
The response of American policy makers will be contested and portentous. The US and Saudi Arabia have a longstanding partnership going back to the Second World War and most in Washington will reflexively argue to prop up the status quo. Others, however, are deeply irritated by Saudi policies and convinced the House of Saud is dilapidated and beyond repair. They will note that the US’s goals of stability and democracy will be better served with Saudi Arabia in the same woeful ranks it is heading for.
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.
Copyright 2013 Brian M Downing
http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Will-the-War-Come-Home-to-Saudi-Arabia-.htm