Who lost Afghanistan?

Brian M Downing 

Twenty years in Afghanistan brought only waste and tragedy. The army and state we built fell apart and the Taliban walked into Kabul. No meaningful inquiry followed, only occasional jabs in last year’s presidential contest. Most of the blows hit Biden but every president since the September 11th attacks deserves a haymaker or two.

Bush

Post-9/11 atmosphere was angry and vengeful. That was understandable but not conducive to sound judgment. The idea of expelling the Taliban and modernizing the Afghanistan was high-minded and resonant with past wars. We defeated Germany and Japan then made them democratic allies.

Problems in Afghanistan were clear from the outset but minimized. Unlike our WW2 enemies Afghanistan comprises several disparate and antagonistic peoples. Corruption pervades, from the villages and towns of Kandahar to the bureaus and villas of Kabul. This was bound to hamstring political and economic hopes and encourage insurgency.

Success depended on Pakistan, especially its Inter-Services Intelligence. But ISI had backed the Taliban since its days as a mujahideen band during the Soviet war. Pakistan saw them as a way to win commerce in Central Asia and become more powerful. Pakistan helped bring the Taliban to power and sent troops to bolster them against northern militias. Al Qaeda fighters served alongside Taliban and Pakistani troops. The fusion of military and commercial interests was likely to disappear, only slip beneath the surface for a while. But Washington trusted the Pakistani generals.

Obama

By the time the new president was sworn in, an insurgency was spreading. Corruption was rampant. Funds vanished, projects stalled. Every villager knew where the money went. The Pentagon watchdog group (SIGAR) issued damning reports every month. Noting this in Washington brought reproach.

The White House tried new approaches. Counterinsurgency would turn the tide by winning over villagers. It opened new opportunities for venality. Drones and special forces raids would decapitate the Taliban leadership and undermine the insurgency. Collateral damage was significant and success limited. 

The Afghan military was expanded and western troops handed over bases to them in stirring ceremonies. The insurgency nonetheless spread. It was now supported by Pakistan, Russia, and Iran. Downing Reports in 2010 suggested abandoning Southern Afghanistan and concentrating on the north. Later reports called for withdrawal. 

Trump

Candidate Trump decried our inability to win wars and suggested terminating failing efforts. As president, he ordered our troops out of Syria but backed down. He saw Afghanistan as a non-performing asset. After predecessors spent two trillion dollars there, with little to show for it, the business term has merits. He ordered negotiations with the Taliban that led to the release of thousands of its fighters and scheduled withdrawal of US forces, advisors, and airpower. The Kabul government wasn’t invited to the talks. 

Kabul officials must’ve seen the writing on the wall but didn’t force through reforms as the Saigon government did when Nixon began to pull out. It was business as usual. The Afghan army held but only with timely reinforcements from its special forces. When the elite troops became overstretched, position after position fell. Back in Kabul, princely sums left the country and private planes fueled up to do the same.

The Afghan effort was well-intentioned but poorly thought out. The withdrawal and inevitable end was awful to see. However, it was the optimal path. The only alternative was keeping some fifty thousand GIs in a landlocked area surrounded by unreliable if not hostile countries – forever. Had the final act occurred during Trump’s watch, he would’ve blamed his predecessors – a view not without merit. Fortune had it come down on his successor.

©2025 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.