Brian M Downing
Wars build states and bring them down as well. Most states were built on and base their legitimacy on military victory. That was true in Charlemagne’s day, Napoleon’s, and Stalin’s too. Defeat, even without surrender or foreign occupation, undermines governments. The French state was staggered by losses to Britain in the Seven Years War and it later disintegrated. Three dynasties fell in 1918. The Argentine junta collapsed after the Falklands War.
Putin’s historical grounding is limited to a mythic understanding of Stalin’s greatness and a paranoid view of communism’s downfall. He embarked on a quixotic war to restore empire. Defeat is coming and so is political trouble.
The army
Putin appointed the top generals and together they built the army and planned the war. The former is one of the worst any major state has fielded and the latter is an ongoing calamity. Opposition will not come from the politicized, sycophantic top generals.
Below them are other generals and field grade officers who realize the incompetence of superiors. Putin and his coterie failed to properly train and equip soldiers or to understand the enemy and its support. They are destroying the army, endangering Russia’s security, and stifling criticism and calls for reform, even from nationalist and expansionist officers.
It’s the sub-elite strata who recognize the incompetence and corruption above them, and take action. In Arab states it was colonels like Nasser and Qaddafi who ousted poor rulers and brought reform. The upshots of course weren’t edifying but the dynamics are clear.
Russia had military reformists after poor showings in the Napoleonic and Crimean wars. (Generals tried to reverse the Gorbachev reforms.) They failed to bring change and paid the price. Since the Bolshevik and Stalin eras, Russian leaders have watched intently for disloyalty among officers. Surveillance capacities are far more sophisticated than in Stalin’s day. The cost of disloyalty is the same.
The public
Opposition gets great attention from western observers but most Russians continue to back the war. Support may have weakened somewhat in numbers and but it’s strengthened in virulence. One the calls for annihilating Ukrainians.
Opposition is based on middle-class urban dwellers. They sometimes engage in public protests and attack government offices, especially induction centers. Hundreds of thousands of them, however, have fled the country since the war began and conscription deepened. Internal opposition may have declined.
A more significant domestic problem may come from veterans, a significant operation of whom will speak of their superiors’ incompetence, corruption, and lies. Friends and families will spread word, albeit carefully. Discontent may be stronger among Mobiks who are treated abysmally and squandered profligately. They may become armed rabbles, fighting other army units and taking what they need from locals. The view is emerging that the poor are taking the casualties while the privileged are safe abed. A sense of malaise and alienation from Putinism is growing. The system is rotting from the head down.
Opposition is stewing in Asian populations. Their sons served and died in disproportionately high numbers since the war’s outset and mobilization is tapping them more than ethnic Russians. Chechens serve in Putin’s army but many serve on the other side. Muslim discontent is stirring in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Tatar regions.
The oligarchy
Russia’s resurgence over the last twenty years was based on Putin’s seizure of key industries (oil, metals, transportation) which had been auctioned off in the nineties. He placed loyalists at the top and used revenue to strengthen the state.
With sanctions and economic decline, loyalty may have wavered. The oligarchs are business-oriented and see the war as a bad investment of resources. Glory and prestige don’t figure in ledgers and the war’s return on investment is negative.
About a dozen key businessmen have died since the war began, almost certainly at Putin’s behest. It’s uncertain if remaining oligarchs are intimidated by him or motivated to oust a reckless, arbitrary despot.
* * *
Putin’s war is bringing appreciable and probably growing opposition in the public and key institutions. It has not reached destabilizing levels, but tightening sanctions and ongoing casualties without signs of progress will raise them. Opposition will alter priorities, lead to harsher but counterproductive repression, and bring army and state close to paralysis.
Putin faces three main dangers:
Jarring protests: serious demonstrations will bring harsh repression but this may deepen protest, further damage the economy, cause disaffection in repressive forces, and strengthen elite opposition. Iran, of ‘79 and today, is a case in point that the Kremlin should be watching.
Ethnic-regional separatism: long restive Muslim areas in the Caucasus may seek to exit Moscow’s rule. They could find help from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan – states that along with the Caucasus are important for oil production and transportation. They want to expand their power and weaken Russia’s.
Assassination or coup: western intelligence believes a coup was thwarted last spring. Security and surveillance have undoubtedly expanded but the threat continues. Russian must have a word for Valkyrie – and perhaps a few Stauffenbergs.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.