US policy and the future of a unified Syria

US policy and the future of a unified Syria

Brian M Downing

Secretary of State Kerry has repeated the administration’s commitment to keeping Syria a united country, as it was before public protest turned into civil war. His statement comes along with a ceasefire agreement with Russia and the announcement of plans for joint operations against ISIL.

This may be another instance of trying to do the impossible in the Islamic world, where countries are breaking apart from North Africa to Central Asia. It may be based less on an understanding of regional dynamics and more on the administration’s hope to burnish its accomplishments in the region before it leaves in January.

Sectarian conflict

Hatred between Shia and Sunni is fiercer now than in many centuries. This is in part due to the sectarian warfare set loose next door in Iraq, when a longstanding Sunni minority was replaced by an embittered and unaccommodating Shia majority, but also when the Assad government slaughtered Sunnis, which turned a broad-based uprising into a sectarian war.

Many of the prominent rebel armies are Salafist and deeply hostile to Shia “apostates”. This isn’t only ISIL and the al Qaeda affiliate (now called Fateh al Sham). It is also true of Ahrar al Sham and many smaller militias. Compromise takes on the trappings of sinfulness and betrayal. It isn’t on the horizon.

Syria resembles France and the German duchies in centuries past, when Protestants and Catholics warred. The zeal to fight over religion was weakened, but only after decades of fighting and millions of dead.

Fragmented opposition

The opposition comprises numerous antagonistic groups, making reconciliation with Damascus and reunification highly unlikely. In addition to the hardline Islamists such as ISIL and Fateh al Sham, there are scores of militias. Some operate under umbrella outfits but have little holding them together except for a desire to fight the government – and other rebel militias.

The Kurds are among the most effective and unified rebel forces. They handed ISIL its first defeat at Kobane last year and have begun to form a national government, separate from Syria, separate from Iraqi Kurdistan too.

Displeased with the Kurds to the south, which are aligned with separatist Kurds in southeastern Turkey, Ankara has invaded Syria. In conjunction with elements of the Free Syrian Army, another rebel umbrella organization, begun to form a buffer state between Kurdish regions. Turkey may be lacking this FSA enclave for decades.

The Syrian Democratic Forces, upon whom the US and other western powers have placed hopes in expelling ISIL from Raqqa, comprise a dozen or more militias of Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and a miscellany of Christian groups. Each has its own goals. One SDF commander hopes to conquer western Iraq, then Saudi Arabia, and establish an emirate. A man of vision, but unlikely to help bring peace in the foreseeable future.

Most rebel groups are backed by foreign powers whose unity consists chiefly in defeating the Assad forces and weakening Shia enemies. Beyond that, each power – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, the West – has its own agenda for the shattered country.

 

It’s difficult to imagine talks involving so many hostile groups, and backed by foreign rivals, leading to national reconciliation. The situation is not akin to the Union and the Confederacy reuniting after Appomattox. It is more like an attempt to bring together the dozens duchies and bishoprics after the fall of Rome. Damascus too has fallen.

Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.