Brian M Downing
Jordan has been in the background while much of the Middle East has burned and raged. It experienced no upheaval as in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. ISIL’s presence isn’t strong in Jordan, though it has pockets of support. The Jordanian military is playing a role in fighting ISIL in Syria. Jordan and Israel have good relations and cooperate on security matters.
Jordan is now experiencing protracted demonstrations over taxation and price hikes. The king has shuffled personnel in the government but unrest remains. Fearful that events in Jordan will spread across the region, as with Tunisia at the outset of the Arab Spring in 2011, wealthy Sunni states are upping subsidies to Jordan.
Jordan may settle down in coming days but the Middle East remains vulnerable to another round of jarring popular protest. It has a large youth cohort, elite-run economies, and reformist groups whose calls range from liberal democracy to a new caliphate. How vulnerable is the region to more upheaval in coming years?
Oil and largesse
The price of oil on world markets has fluctuated wildly since the $100/bbl days of the Arab Spring. Prices plunged 70% a few years later, bringing sharp budget cuts in many Middle Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s disbursements to its subjects pared down. Unrest seemed bound to erupt.
Prices have recovered to $76/bbl. The direction of prices will depend on the impact of US sanctions on Iranian exports, infrastructure inadequacies in Venezuela, and the surprising rise in US production and exports. However, Saudi efforts to drive up prices to $100/bbl have stalled with recent production bumps in the Kingdom and Russia.
Sectarian conflict
Sunni states are engaged in wars with Shia adversaries in Syria, Yemen, and to some extent Iraq. Wars typically rally populations to their leaders, but this might not be the case today. Many young people do not share the sectarian passions of their rulers and elders. This was made clear in Arab Spring demonstrations in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Syria where Sunnis and Shias march together for change.
The fighting is done chiefly by proxies – Kurds and Arabs, Americans and Brits. Nonetheless, Saudi and Jordanian troops may be heading into eastern Syria. Casualties might bring trouble at home. (The Houthis of Yemen may be counting on this as they fight Emirati troops at Hodeida.) And the financial costs will cut into domestic largesse.
Many Sunnis will be appalled that their rulers are working closely with the US and Israel – powers widely disliked if not deemed “satanic” in fatwas and even the words of rulers in recent declamations.
The Palestinian issue
For decades Sunni leaders have called for a Palestinian state. Now they remain quiet as settlements continue, the US embassy relocates, and Gazans are shot down. Mohammad bin Salman’s acquiescence brought demurrals from the aged king. Objections are probably prevalent elsewhere in the royal family, army, and the Kingdom in general.
Anti-Saudi sentiment
The Saudis have used their money over the years to win support and influence governments. The results have been mixed as Saudi princes are widely seen as a haughty elite whose outward religiosity masks decadence.
Saudi influence in the region has increased in recent years. Its mosques and schools have created sizable followings in countries such as Egypt where many people see the princes as meddlers and their followers as traitors. Outside the religious sphere Riyadh’s subsidies go to armies and states. Egypt would be far worse off without Saudi money but the relationship has nonetheless bred popular animosities.
ISIL
The Islamist army that shook the region has been driven from their major city holdings but retain positions in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Their appeal is probably broader than thought in the West and in Sunni capitals.
The 2014 ISIL offensive underscored the political and military weaknesses of rulers in a horrifying manner. Kings, princes, and ministers could not stand up to a relatively small and ill-equipped but determined force. They had to go to the US and Britain for help. Without western might, the map of the region would have been scrapped.
Some ISIL jihadis are fighting to the last, others are coming home, or trying to. They will bring more experience than the whole Saudi army and more appeal than their princes.
Repressive capacities
One of the lessons that regional rulers learned from the Arab Spring was the importance of security forces and the willingness to use brute force. In Tunisia, security forces were in disarray. In Egypt, they stood by and even seemed to embrace change. In time though, it was clear the army sacrificed Mubarak, then collaborated with the Saudis to install a military oligarchy – a process that saw over 900 people shot down in Cairo.
In Bahrain, Saudi and Pakistani troops crushed a reform movement. Methods were harsher and on a larger scale in Syria, where airstrikes, massacres, and even chemical weapons were used. Middle Eastern rulers took note: brutal tactics work and foreign capitals will not respond forcefully – not against hostile states such as Syria, not against friendly ones such as Saudi Arabia. Middle-Eastern people took note too: Saudi Arabia is determined to prevent democracy, not only in the Kingdom but the entire region as well. And most foreign capitals will look on, if not provide the means of repression.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.