Brian M Downing
Russia’s winter offensive continues. Wagner Group and airborne forces are pressing attacks around Bakhmut – north and south of it as well. They are seizing little ground but taking high casualties. Last year Ukraine took Russian punches in a manner likened here to Muhammad Ali’s “rope-a-dope” strategy against bigger opponents: let them expend their energy with insignificant punches, then go on the attack. Foreman went down hard in Kinshasa.
Ukraine drove the Russians from Kharkiv and Kherson. Retreats turned into routs. Tons of equipment were abandoned. The same may happen this spring. But which side is in better shape and where will the blow fall?
The Russian army
After several defeats last year, Moscow patched up its army with conscripts and mercenaries. They were neither trained nor well-equipped but they were infused with exhortations of the nation imperiled and a new Great Patriotic War. Putin and his generals are convinced that numbers and ardor will be decisive and that they will steamroll Ukraine and end the war.
Efforts to take Bakhmut and other parts of the Donbas have shown formidable resolve. Paratroopers and mercenaries have been launching ground attacks since last fall. Their determination and willingness to take heavy losses have surprised most observers (including me) but they are unlikely to be representative of the Russian army as a whole. Nor are the losses sustainable.
The bulk of the army has been stagnant for months and continues to take casualties from drones, snipers, and indirect fire. This is corrosive on morale and effectiveness. Replacements are of poor quality and likely detract from unit cohesion. They know Putin’s winter offensive has expended lives but gained almost nothing. They also know what’s coming in the spring.
The Ukrainian army
Russian artillery, drones, and ground attacks have inflicted high casualties on the Ukrainians. American intelligence, however, believes that around Bakhmut, the Russians have lost five KIAs for every Ukrainian. This can can be attributed mainly to advantages of defensive positions and poor Russian tactics.
Ukrainian morale appears to remain high. The army has had several successes and its equipment improves by the day. Troops are defending their homeland and know defeat means annihilation.
Ukrainian and NATO intelligence will find vulnerabilities in Russian positions stretching along the Donbas pocket and into the land bridge. No army can defend everything, perhaps least of all Russia’s. Interior lines of communication allow Ukraine to allocate resources to promising areas and make important breakthroughs that could send regular Russian forces packing, as around Kharkiv last year. This would force Moscow to redeploy better units to hold the lines, though of course those forces have been badly depleted.
The land bridge
Kyiv may be looking to Zaporizhzhia and Melitopol – a possibility outlined here last November (http://www.downingreports.com/feint-and-opportunity-on-the-southern-front/). The former city has held off Russian troops since February, though a nearby nuclear power plant was taken, and it could be the starting point for a drive south to Melitopol – a distance of only 60 kms. If Ukrainian forces liberate or approach that road hub, Russian forces in the south would be cut in two and the Crimean peninsula would be in danger.
Russia would be forced into a major battle. The Ukrainians have superior training, weaponry, discipline, morale, and lines of communication while Russian forces rely on an incompetent logistical system stretched over long distances and relying on vulnerable bridges. Partisan forces are increasingly active along supply routes. Moscow will demand that the area north of the Crimea be held. At this point poor morale and discipline may make that impossible and ruinous.
By summer, the stage may be set for an effort to retake Crimea but access points are narrow and well defended. Ukraine may opt to use long-range weapons (drones, HIMARS, airstrikes) and guerrilla operations to destroy Russian bases and wear down ground forces. It forced Russia to abandon Snake Island last year. It may use the same methods on a larger scale to make Crimea a deathtrap for Putin’s army.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.