Brian M Downing
Russia’s drive on Kharkiv earlier this year showed early promise but came to a halt. As with previous attempts to regain the initiative, around Bakhmut for example, it took little ground and incurred tens of thousands of casualties. This week Ukraine crossed into Kursk, a Russian province and site of a decisive battle in 1943 where Germany took high casualties and went on the defensive until Berlin fell. Ukraine has attacked into this part of Russia before with drones and brief incursions. This drive has gone deeper than before and presents problems for Putin and his generals.
The Russian leaders must be embarrassed and angry, all the more so after weeks of Ukrainian drone strikes on oil infrastructure and air bases. Some were well north of Moscow. Counterattacks thus far have fared poorly. Two battalions have been cut to pieces. Many troops were killed and many surrendered. Confusion and mistrust must be deeper up and down the command chain. Generals may well be fearful of Putin’s wrath and want to avoid windows in tall buildings.
Russia will have to beef up Kursk by pulling experienced troops out of Ukraine. Crimea and the land bridge have profound importance and cannot be weakened. The troops will likely come from the east. That will present opportunities for Ukraine.
Ukraine is unlikely to go much deeper into Kursk. It may seek promontories and river banks to fortify. Putin cannot allow even a small part of his domain to be in the hands of inferior people aligned with the West. A major battle is coming. A poorly-trained and badly-led army will have to repeatedly assault fortified positions held by superior troops. The scale of this Kursk battle will be much smaller than the 1943 one but it may be as important as it presents the possibility of severely damaging the Russian army’s offensive ability and internal discipline.
The incursion resonates with the imperiled nation ideology of the Great Patriotic War that’s cemented resolve in the public and rank and file. However, it may also cause disquiet. This shouldn’t have happened, especially after two-and-a half years of sacrifice, and they need to see progress. Stalin threw the Germans back from Moscow, annihilated an army at Stalingrad, and stopped a major offensive, paradoxically at Kursk, all within two-and-a half years. Putin has nothing comparable to show his people.
Draft resistance may be stronger, as might disciplinary troubles on the fronts and training bases. Muslim and Asian populations may become more restive. They already believe casualties fall disproportionately on them. Average Russians, believers in Putin and his mission, may ask questions, if only in private, about true casualties, war leadership, and perhaps even the justifications for the special military operation that’s become a long war.
©2024 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.
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