Brian M Downing
Oil and power
The international interest in Libya is of course mainly about oil, but not simply for the commodity on the world market. Oil and gas can be used to expand power. Russia uses its hydrocarbons to gain influence in Europe and corral former SSRs that might otherwise lean elsewhere. Saudi Arabia uses petrodollars throughout the Islamic world to subsidize schools and armies which inculcate Salafism and appreciation of the House of Saud. Qatar and Iran fund the Muslim Brotherhood to counter Saudi influence.
The effort to buy international influence doesn’t always work out. Venezuela used its oil revenue to build an anti-US league, which included Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, until its oil revenues plummeted from years of mismanagement. Qaddafi tried to build a league of beholden African states but was swept away by domestic revolt – based in large part on opposition to his foreign expenditures.
Libya has considerable oil and gas resources, nearby markets in the EU, and a small population – just above six million. That is one-third less than the population of Cairo. Political stability and less exorbitant foreign spending could restore Libya’s position in world politics – and several powers realize it.
The rivals
Saudi Arabia is eager to see Libyan wealth and spending integrated into its league of Sunni states, led from Riyadh of course. Qatar, Iran, and Turkey want Libya in their sphere – or at least not in Saudi Arabia’s. Each side may prefer that Libya remains in chaos than see it align with its adversary.
Russia wants to increase its influence with all sides. Moscow already has Iran firmly in its camp and wants to detach Turkey from NATO – a project well underway as evidenced by recent large arms sales. But Russia wants to move closer to the Saudis and their Sunni allies in order to increase arms sales to them and to eventually replace American power in the region altogether. Libya, then, presents a serious dilemma. Backing Iran and Turkey comes at the expense of angering the Saudis and their Sunni allies.
Partition?
Libya has never been a unified country and it’s unlikely to become one. Neither Italy (its former colonial ruler) nor the post-WW2 monarchy nor Qaddafi ever built a unified country. Libya comprises, if barely, three regions: Tripolitania in the northwest, Fezzan in the southwest, and Cyrenaica in the east.
The present international contest may lead to a partition of Libya, de facto or not. Haftar and his Saudi backers will control Cyrenaica, the Turkish-Qatari-Muslim Brotherhood have a presence, though not a powerful one, in Tripolitania. Landlocked Fezzan is tied to Tripolitania.
The US
The American position isn’t clear. The foreign policy team is missing quite a few players. Many under-secretary positions are vacant. Many top positions are held by managers not strategic thinkers. Three generals in prominent roles have been tweeted out the door. However, the US seems to be in step with the Saudis in supporting Haftar but the president changes his mind on short notice. Look at the pullouts from Syria. US troops are still there.
The US should be concerned with Saudi power in the region. It has gathered the GCC states onto its side, lavished money on the Egyptian and Pakistani armies, and is working on the Sudan, Algeria, Yemen, and now Libya – the wealthiest of them all. The view here is that US-Israeli support for Saudi Arabia is strengthening and emboldening a ruthless prince who despises the both nominal allies.
American and Israeli interests would be better served by containing Saudi power and encouraging rival powers such as Turkey and Qatar to act as balancers. Iran could play the same balancing role but US-Iranian relations are abysmal and no rapprochement is on the horizon.
By backing Turkey in Libya the US could also benefit by driving a wedge between Erdogan and Putin and keeping Turkey closer to the West than to Russia.
The US could also support a partitioned Libya and try to see that neither Tripolitania nor Cyrenaica is closely aligned to one foreign power or another. After all, Libya’s oil wealth is considerable and there would be appreciable domestic support for using that wealth to achieve independence from the peripheral and nettlesome schemes of ambitious strongmen, whether in Ankara, Moscow, or Riyadh.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.