Brian M Downing
The optimism of 2011’s Arab Spring gave way long ago to civil war, jihadism, and disintegration. When Qaddafi met his end in a ditch, Libya became especially chaotic. The colonel governed through personal power and subservient local councils. When he went, the councils vanished and the country had no government, only a slew of rivalrous militias.
The militias and jihadi groups fought for control. Two main groups remain: the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Khalifa Haftar in the east and the fractious Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west. Each side has considerable foreign backing in the form of diplomatic support, military equipment, and mercenaries. The internationalization of the war may deepen if Turkish president Erdogan follows up on his statement of sending in troops.
Haftar and the LNA
Civil wars usually bring support from foreign powers with economic ties to one side or the other and geopolitical ambitions in the region. Britain’s mill owners pressed London to help the Confederacy elide the Union blockade on cotton. The Spanish Civil War of the 1930s brought in communist and fascist help and set the stage for the next world war. Today, wars in Yemen and Syria have been complicated by foreign involvement – protracted too.
With a long CV that includes service to Qaddafi and the CIA, Haftar established a power base in Benghazi, seized control of oil pipelines and export terminals, and launched a drive on the GNA’s various militias around Tripoli.
Haftar had already gathered support from abroad. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are eager to build a league of beholden Sunni powers stretching from the Maghreb to Pakistan. Last year, Haftar boarded the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov returning from Syrian waters and parleyed with Russian officials. He later visited Moscow. Putin is now backing the LNA with hardware and several hundred mercenaries from a mercenary outfit known the Wagner Group.
Haftar has even won support from France which is eager to see stability in Libya and in its former colonies to the south, which are losing ground to Islamist and separatist forces, probably aided by arms from Libya.
The GNA in Tripoli
The government in Tripoli is recognized by many countries as the legitimate authority. But substantive foreign backing isn’t strong. Most countries, especially European ones just to the north, see the government as too divided and want no active part in the conflict. Wars in the region they know from long experience to be quagmires.
Further, many foreign countries are coming to see stability under Haftar as an unpleasant but perhaps optimal outcome. He will stem arm flows to jihadi groups in the south and refugee flows to the north.
Foreign support comes from Middle Eastern states concerned by growing Saudi power. Qatar, Iran, and Turkey have long opposed Riyadh’s growing hegemony and used the international Muslim Brotherhood in the effort. The Saudis and their GCC allies oppose the Brotherhood for its stance against monarchy. This parallels the infighting in the Syrian civil war where Saudi-backed forces fought those of the Brotherhood at least as much as they did the Syrian army.
Enter Turkey
Erdogan announced his intention of sending Turkish troops to back the GNA around Tripoli. The GNA’s militias have found a measure of unity as they oppose Haftar’s attacks, mainly from advantageous defensive positions, but they incapable of sustained offensive operations.
Erdogan supports the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya and elsewhere, in part because of political-religious affinities, in part because they both oppose Saudi hegemony. The Brotherhood has a presence in Libya and stronger ones in most Islamic countries, including a sizable underground inside Saudi Arabia itself. Further, Ankara and Tripoli support each other on offshore oil claims in the Mediterranean.
A brigade or so of Turkish troops, if deployed, could turn the tide. Well-trained and -equipped, Turkish troops could break the siege of Tripoli in short order and chase Haftar’s LNA back east. However, problems would likely mount. Supplying troops in Libya might prove burdensome, though Erdogan might demand help from NATO. Turkey is still a member, albeit a dubious one just now, and Erdogan might entice help in exchange for less coziness with Russia. After all, Turkey and Russia are on opposing sides in Libya and may come to blows.
Turkish troops are already deployed into Syria and will be facing determined resistance from both Syrian and Turkish Kurds. Fighting in Syria and Libya could prove costly and open-ended. The Kurds and the LNA can see that it becomes just that.
Erdogan has purged the army of most of its leaders and replaced them with loyalists whose competence is questionable – the bane of Middle Eastern armies. If conflicts abroad drag on, his control of the army might be less firm than he thinks.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.