Brian M Downing
A Ukrainian offensive is coming. When and where aren’t known. The view here has been that, after probes and feints, a drive into the land bridge will come. This could split Russian forces in the south in two, force a major battle, and endanger the Crimean peninsula.
What condition is the Russian army in after so many casualties and so much bad weather? How secure is support back home?
Morale
While Wagner Group and airborne units have hammered away around Bakhmut, the bulk of the army has been stretched along a vast pocket from northern Ukraine to Luhansk and Donetsk to the Black Sea coast east of the Dnipro. Most Russian units have demonstrated no offensive spirit. Since being driven from Kharkiv and Kherson last year, they’ve only been in static, vulnerable positions and subjected to steady attacks by artillery, drones, snipers, and partisans. Protracted stagnation and casualties create lethargy. They’ve heard of the casualties around Bakhmut and the absence of significant gains. Now, they await for the war to shift onto them.
Effectiveness
Most regulars have endured high casualties and a hard winter. Replacements are poorly-trained and badly-equipped. Most are conscripts who might not be integrating well with the regulars. Officers are unprofessional and feel no need to earn respect through effective leadership. There is no NCO corps to build camaraderie with troops, mediate orders from distant superiors, and buck up flagging morale.
If there’s any improvement in tactical skill, it stems from hard experience, not reform – badly needed though it is. Soon they will be required to respond to Ukrainian probes, feints, and attempts at breakthroughs. Many units won’t be up to the task. Ukrainian breakthroughs are likely – perhaps north and south of Bakhmut, encircling Wagner and airborne units, or along the land bridge.
Logistics
Army logistics were poor at the war’s outset. Rations, ammo, and fuel weren’t reaching troops on the roads to Kyiv, Kharkiv, or anywhere else. It’s unclear if anything’s improved. Supply lines are long, especially those stretching to the land bridge and Crimea, and partisans hit convoys and require more troops to patrol rear areas. Lacking the interior lines of communication that Ukraine has, Russia will be hard-pressed to get supplies and reinforcements to points where Ukraine attacks.
Putin may have already decided to concentrate on the land bridge. This presents opportunities elsewhere. If lines crumble in Luhansk and Donetsk, retreat from the land bridge will make strategic sense. This will not be palatable as Crimea has great historical significance going back to previous wars and strategic importance today for operations in the Middle East and North Africa.
Homefront
Support for the war remains strong. Putin has convinced the public that the Russian nation is endangered by the West, as it was in 1941 when Germany and allies invaded and killed 20-27 million. The war lives on in family lore, schoolbooks, and state commemorations. Those incandescent memories have been adroitly though dishonestly mobilized and sent to war. It’s the most powerful component of the effort. Without it, Putin’s standing would suffer and paralysis, turmoil, and defeat would loom.
Opposition isn’t strong. Hundreds of thousands of potential dissidents have fled the country and are no longer in the political calculus. Those remaining face arrest and imprisonment from the state and glares and punches from the public. Moscow is making it worse for them.
Putin may think support is strong and unwavering, as it was for Stalin during the Great Patriotic War. This may be another error. Two years after the June 1941 invasion, Stalin could point to indisputable signs of progress. By the first winter, the Reich’s assaults had been halted outside Moscow, then thrown back. The following winter, a German army was encircled and annihilated at Stalingrad. The German summer offensive was blunted at Kursk with heavy losses. All this two years after the invasion.
Putin is unlikely to be able to present indisputable signs of progress at the two-year mark of his war. Maps may show bitter losses rather than inspiring gains. Accounts from veterans may be dispiriting, even shocking. Rumors may swirl about casualties. The Russian language may need a term for “credibility gap”, though it won’t be broadcast in news reports, only whispered in private gatherings.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.