The US takes on China, part one 

Brian M Downing 

President Trump has been critical of China since his 2016 campaign. The attacks are more pronounced now as Covid-19 spreads and another election looms. The election is on and so is a critical geopolitical contest. Economics, politics, and proxies are more central than direct warfare for now. 

China knows that it has been the greatest world power in every century of recorded history except for the last two and is eager to end the historical anomaly. Over the last quarter century the Chinese economy has boomed and the vision of global dominance seems within reach by mid-century. The US, however, is in the way.

Trump has important issues to bolster his position in the contest. However, he also has baggage and neither the public nor key allies will be as supportive as might be expected, critical though it is to the US and the world. 

Economics 

States have been competing for wealth and power at least since Rome and Carthage vied for mastery of the Mediterranean. Later, Britain and France fought over the New World and the Dutch Republic and Spain exchanged salvoes from Europe to Southeast Asia. Outcomes were lasting and often ruinous. Today the US is losing markets, manufacturing strength, and access to raw materials – often to allies and reliable trade partners, but most importantly today, to China.

Beijing does not want a substantial military presence around the world. That was the costly mistake of old hegemons such as Britain and the US. China wants to align with beholden nations, control natural resources such as iron, copper, and rare earths, and weaken rivals. 

Commodity prices and availability will vary along with a purchasing country’s deference to Beijing. Independent-minded states and adversaries will face shortages and cutoffs. China threatened a curtailment of rare earths to Japan following a collision between Chinese and Japanese ships in 2013 and did the same vis-a-vis the US last year. The levers are in place.

Geopolitics

China wants to become the dominant economic and diplomatic power in the world and the dominant military power in East Asia. No country seeking global power and respect can forego military might. China’s planes and ships will guarantee East Asian security. American forces must pull back to Midway and Pearl Harbor. That means a diminution of American influence, military presence, and access to local markets.

China sees the US military presence in East Asia as a threat to its sea lanes, especially those stretching to oil resources in the Persian Gulf. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over waters and islands and created artificial islands. Radar and missile sites pose a danger to foreign vessels. American aircraft carriers and attendant warships have plied Asian waters without fear since the end of World War Two. They can no longer safely operate close to the mainland in event of war.

Beijing and Moscow work together to probe American resolve in various parts of the world. One or both states support North Korea, the Taliban, Shia militias in Iraq, the Maduro government in Venezuela, Ukrainian separatists, and Libyan warlords. Chinese and Russian ships and planes menace US counterparts, their intelligence bureaus disseminate falsehoods and direct sophisticated cyberwarfare operations. 

The two powers are building a league of states in Latin America that presently includes Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Peru. If Venezuela’s oil resources can be returned to former production levels, the wealth can be used to strength their league and through generous disbursements, bring more regional states into the fold.  

The US once had good ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia. This “twin pillars” policy kept the region stable – and pro-West. Today China buys immense amounts of oil from the two regional powers and is positioning itself, along with Russia, to become the new guarantor of Gulf security.

Representative government 

While western powers call for political reforms in many parts of the world, albeit intermittently and often disingenuously, Beijing exerts no such pressure. Chinese leaders point to their nation’s past, when foreign powers extorted concessions and patrolled its rivers. They present a nonjudgmental stance toward foreign countries’ internal affairs, as long as they allow Chinese corporations to build, extract, and export. 

China’s growth is further endangering democracy around the world, though it serves its interests in some countries. Beijing respects representative government in East Asia and the US, as it allows business people enamored of opportunities in China to articulate Beijing’s positions. 

The issues are clear, the stakes high. But what support can Trump marshal?

© 2020 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.