Brian M Downing
The US and Iran could be allies again. Angry verbal exchanges notwithstanding, geopolitical dynamics present both countries with common interests and enemies, as they did many years ago when Washington and Tehran cooperated closely in the region. Elites and ideologies pose obstacles to renewed cooperation, but if there is to be stability in the region, the two nations must work together on political development in Iraq and on countering the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Iraq
In the last few months, the US and Iran have been less antagonistic and, without apparent coordination, have brought about a level of stability in Iraq that was unthinkable a year ago. The two powers have been successful in greatly reducing sectarian warfare: the US (and Saudi Arabia) in the Sunni center, Iran in the Shi’a south.
Iran has failed to drive the US from Iraq by directing Shi’a militias to attrit US forces and thereby undermine American support for the war. Iran now uses its influence with Shi’a groups to stabilize Iraq. Shi’a militias have conspicuously refrained from engagements with Sunni counterparts, US troops, and each other, which has reduced fighting far more than has anything associated with General Petraeus’s surge. Stability has enabled Iran to urge Shi’a parties to press for a US departure, which Washington has long promised once stability is reached.
Rather than working on separate though complementary efforts, the US and Iran must cooperate formally and directly. They can press Shi’a and Sunni to form a coalition government or negotiate a federal system. Cooperation can perhaps even bring about the stated goal of US policy – a viable representative government in the region – as authoritarian, sectarian rule is no longer possible.
Afghanistan
The US and Iran have been pursuing similar goals in Afghanistan for decades. Iran provided sanctuaries for and supplied the mujahideen in their war against the Soviet Union, and has long opposed the Taliban, which massacred thousands of Shi’a, including several Iranians, around Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998. Iran helped oust the Taliban three years later, supports the Karzai government, deported militants such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (curiously, once a CIA protegé; now an al Qaeda ally), and administers development programs in western Afghanistan. (Accordingly, reports that Iran supplies the Taliban are unconvincing claims at best, manipulative propaganda at worst.) As the Taliban reasserts control over large parts of the south and over Pashtun and other enclaves in the north, and as NATO commitment waivers, the US cannot afford to shun cooperation with anyone.
Events in Pakistan may make cooperation a necessity. Pakistan is becoming increasingly unstable, not only in the tribal areas along the Afghani frontier, but throughout the country as well. Islamist parties and movements are on the rise. The Taliban (both Afghani and Pakistani franchises) and al Qaeda are poised to cut off US/NATO supply lines running from the port of Karachi, through the narrow passes along the frontier, and into Afghanistan. Taliban and al Qaeda fighters will seek to close the passes; allies in the large Pashtun refugee population in Karachi will attack logistical facilities there. Iranian roads are the only alternative. They are quite far from Kabul but close to US logistical bases in the Persian Gulf.
Collateral Benefits
Aside from cooperation on Iraq and Afghanistan, better relations between the US and Iran will increase world oil supplies, strengthen representative government in Iran, and ease tensions between Iran and Israel. The US has long hoped to access the energy resources of Central Asia by building pipelines from Central Asia, across Afghanistan, and ultimately to Pakistani ports. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan will be stable enough in the near future to warrant infrastructural investment. An alternate pipeline route could run from Central Asia to Iranian ports.
Cooperation will help nudge Iran toward representative government. Threats between Washington and Tehran have rallied young, otherwise reform minded Iranians to the mullahs and the nationalism they lay claim to and use to justify electoral restrictions. Relaxed tensions will help rearrange internal priorities away from national security and war, toward growth and reform.
An intuitively compelling criticism of a US-Iran opening is that it will come at the expense of Israel. However, cooperation with Iran implies neither endorsement of mullahs nor betrayal of friends. The US and Israel are obviously closely tied. Iran recognizes this and will see reduced invective toward Israel as a compromise necessary to attain stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to benefit from Central Asian energy resources.
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Over the last three decades the US and Iran, though antagonistic and often seemingly on the brink of war, have had common interests in the region – as they had prior to the 1979 revolution. Furthermore, each is now pursuing policies in Iraq and Afghanistan that often complement the other’s. Pragmatic factions in each country’s foreign policy machinery must see the opportunities for and benefits of further cooperation.
©2008 Brian M. Downing