Brian M Downing
Ukraine’s offensive is proceeding more slowly than expected. Two months on, and there’s no breakthrough as around Kharkiv and Kherson last year. The slow going doesn’t stem from an improved Russian army. Training, logistics, and leadership remain inadequate by major power standards. It’s based on layers of mines and trenches that Russia built in the winter and spring. Ukrainian troops have taken heavy casualties. Russian casualties are probably relatively low as troops have defensive advantages.
So where are we? What’s coming in Crimea?
The fronts
In Donetsk, Ukraine is making appreciable advances north and south of Bakhmut. A pincer drive may be forming. Though perhaps not central to Kyiv’s campaign, Bakhmut is a source of pride to Russia as it seized the medium-size town after several months of costly attacks. US estimates, which are cautious, say 20,000 Russian dead. Losing the town would be an embarrassment to Moscow, all the more so if it orders a stand and Kyiv is able to encircle the defenders.
Ukrainian forces are also making gradual progress from Zaporizhzhia into the land bridge. The pace has picked up in recent days, though they are still about thirty kilometers from the Sea of Azov and the two narrow isthmuses leading into Crimea. Ukraine has strengthened positions east of the Dnipro which opens a new line of advance, though one more difficult to support than the one from Zaporizhzhia as the Dnipro bridges are mostly gone and the terrain is marshy.
A rapid breakthrough is still possible. Western armor and training may come to bear. The history of defensive positions is unpromising, as Maginot and Bar Lev learned. Russian reserves aren’t deep. The best troops, the Wagner Group and airborne units, took very heavy losses in Bakhmut. The former is reconstituting itself far off in Belarus. If a segment of land bridge defenses weakens, reinforcements will have to be rushed in from other areas. The long exterior lines of communication are vulnerable to interdiction.
Crimea
The decisive battle will be fought in Crimea. The region is vital to Russian prestige and logistics in the Middle East and North Africa. The Wagner Group is now vying to control Niger. The battle for Crimea might not entail ground operations, at least not initially. Ukraine is accumulating long-range weapons such as HIMARS and Storm Shadow and Taurus missiles. A protracted battle using these weapons in conjunction with pressure on the land bridge could wear down Russian positions and resolve.
Missiles can repeatedly strike air fields, naval bases, logistical hubs, and ships. The Kerch Bridge linking Crimea to Russia has been hit several times already. Its days may be numbered. Other bridges linking Crimea to the land bridge have also been hit. The same can hold for ports brinhing in supplies.
Partisan operations are already underway on the land bridge and will spread into Crimea. The Ukrainian population will provide the sea that the partisans thrive in. The same holds for Tatar people who have long despised Russia. Now they have allies and weapons.
The Ukrainian military has recently trained in amphibious operations – and widely publicized them. This hasn’t gone unnoticed in Russia and will require sizable troop numbers to be allocated to coastal areas to prevent landings behind positions, perhaps along with airmobile units, on the land bridge and Crimea itself. A foothold could roll up Russian positions as the Inchon landing did in the Korean War.
The battle could go on into 2024. Russian troops may face serious supply problems, especially if the bridges and ports are continuously hit. Troops rotating in and out may be routinely interdicted and bring high casualties. Many soldiers will think twice about running a gauntlet to reach the peninsula then facing unending attacks. Morale could deteriorate as casualties go on and on and supplies become tenuous.
Paradoxically, there are advantages to a slow grinding campaign. A sudden collapse of Russian positions in Crimea could lead to rash responses from Putin. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant could be destroyed, leading to hundreds of square kilometers of radioactive wasteland. A series of tactical nuclear weapons could be used across the land bridge to draw a line, demonstrate resolve, and firm support at home.
A costly siege could gravely weaken the Russian army, deepen the chasm between Putin and his generals, and create doubt in the public. Soldiers and generals, officials and subjects, may see Crimea as another Snake Island – the small tract of land Russia occupied early in the war. The army soon realized it couldn’t hold Snake Island without taking endless and ultimately unacceptable casualties.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.