Brian M Downing
The new administration takes over following the erratic previous one. Trump dropped out of the JCPOA, the Paris climate agreement, and the TPP. He opted not to fill numerous positions in State and Defense, leaving decisions in the hands of inexperienced colleagues and family members.
The administration, however, can’t be accused of being especially interventionist. Trump’s words have been tough and even bellicose but his use of the military has been more restrained than almost all his predecessors since WW2. He has been on the brink of war with Iran but stepped back. He has deployed troops to send messages rather than deliver ordnance.
Traditional reasons for restraint are pacifist beliefs that oppose use of force, Realpolitik convictions which narrow interventionist rationales, and hard wartime experiences that work against pressures to fight. None of these are apparent in Trump’s background or utterances.
Why then has the present administration been relatively restrained, despite many continuing and often expanding conflicts and continuous war drums along the Potomac?
Russia
A ready explanation is the president’s cozy relationship with his Russian counterpart. Trump has made puzzling, even concerning statements in Putin’s defense. This caused speculation of blackmail, secret agreements, illicit funding, and so on. There isn’t evidence of any of these things.
Trump might well have business aspiration in Russia, however that has not held him back from inflicting serious losses on Russian mercenaries in Syria, arming the Ukraine, shuttling troops into Eastern Europe, and imposing sanctions.
Mistrust of elites
Americans like outsiders to become their presidents. Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush the Younger, and Obama all campaigned as challengers to Washington elites and therefore able to effect beneficial change. Trump presents himself in the same light. He has been suspicious of and aloof from the counsel of generals, the intelligence community, and think tanks – for good and bad reasons.
Most of those institutions are culturally predisposed to intervention. Decisions to bring democracy to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria all had broad support from the foreign policy machinery. Realpolitik has a distinguished history in Washington and the academy, but there isn’t much money in it.
Trump has had retired or active-duty generals around him and the present crop, like those who were junior officers in Vietnam, are dismayed by present wars and unsupportive of another one, say, against Iran. But they ran afoul of the president and have been shown the door.
Trump’s outsider ideology is fused with dilettantism and egotism. He may also sense a decided amateurism in family members and like-minded appointees in State and Defense. This may be deterring him from embarking upon anything as complicated as a war, at least thus far.
Cost benefit
Trump is essentially a businessman – one who speaks bluntly, and bargains hard, and twists arms. He weighs expenses and assesses consequences, then goes ahead or holds back. A property is developed or not. If it fails, the plug is pulled and the accountants take it from there.
That calculus may be at work as he looks at various troubles spots. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other places call out for investment and development. Predecessors saw to that, before leaving office and handing the problems off to successors. Trump sees no benefit from going any further, not for the economy and not for himself. He may be astute enough to realize no one can predict the consequences. And for the same reason he may be reluctant to completely withdraw from wars he deemed unwinnable.
Trump’s outsider status, mistrust of foreign policy elites, and business-like approach to most questions may be responsible for the dearth of military action. They are insufficient to make for sound foreign policy but they be a useful if shaky stand-in for Realpolitik.
(Next: Interventionist pressure in the Biden administration)
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.