Brian M Downing
There’ve been signs of progress in the on-and-off talks to end the Afghan war. President Trump, applying a business-like approach, wants to liquidate the war and has mentioned halving the US presence there. The Taliban note progress in the Doha parleys and have sent an important figure to take part in them.
Why would the Taliban agree to a settlement when they hold the upper hand in the war? ANA outposts give way routinely. District after district falls to the insurgents or at least see their presence grow. Primarily a Pashtun movement based in the south and east, the Taliban are garnering support in non-Pashtun parts of the north now. And more foreign countries are supporting the Taliban now.
Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons why the Taliban might have abandoned any notion of conquering the whole country and will proceed with substantive talks.
No reconquest
The Taliban realize that taking all Afghanistan is impossible. Even at the height of their rule, 20 years ago, they never controlled the north. The Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras there held a redoubt and were supported by Iran and Russia. An effort today would fare no better: the northerners are even better armed and trained now and can rely on continued foreign help in their northern redoubt.
Casualties
There are no reliable casualty figures from either side. The Taliban and Kabul have little in common except adroitness in overstating successes and minimizing defeats. In recent years, engagements have been larger in scale as the Taliban assault fortified ANA outposts, sizable towns, and even a few provincial capitals.
Such campaigns require the Taliban to mass troops, which are vulnerable to the firepower at the hands of the ANA, especially American airpower. Pilots don’t always hit what they aim at, civilian casualties abound, but the attacks surely entail high Taliban casualties. And repeated exposure to airpower wearies the rank and file.
Pakistan
The Taliban have received support from Pakistan since the chaos following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Taliban forces were conquering territory through battles and parleys and seemed a way for Pakistan to establish an ally and secure trade routes into the ‘Stans. Since then, Pakistan has delivered arms and money and granted safe havens south of the Durand Line.
The US has long pressured Pakistan to nudge the Taliban to the negotiating table, but without success. Today, however, China is applying the same pressure, and Pakistan sees the war blowing back on it.
ISIL
Having lost most of its territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIL is looking to Afghanistan and the ‘Stans as a new home. Its affiliate, IS-Khorasan, has established itself in a handful of Afghan districts and convinced a few Taliban commanders to come over. Like-minded Islamist groups ensconced in eastern Afghanistan have also joined IS-K. The Taliban do not want to see their movement supplanted by another. A settlement could reduce foreign support for IS-K and win foreign support for crushing it.
International support
Once backed only by Pakistan, the Taliban in recent years have been receiving help from Iran and Russia. They want to bleed the US and establish a measure of good relations with an inevitable winner, at least in Afghanistan’s south and east.
Iranian and Russian support give them leverage with the Taliban. Neither state wants Sunni militancy to gain ground and draw in foreign recruits. Both see the Taliban as less disposed to international jihad than ISIL and amenable to extinguishing IS-K and kindred groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan.
Russia is concerned with IS-K spreading into the ‘Stans, which it sees as in their sphere – the Near Abroad. They are deeply concerned with IS-K’s stated determination to strike back at Russia for intervening in Syria.
Settlement
Details of an agreement are undetermined of course, but a likely outline can be drawn.
– The Taliban will govern most of the east and south and refrain from expansion.
– In exchange, the Taliban will be given development aid from foreign countries and from Afghanistan’s export revenues from oil, copper, iron, and rare earths which, with peace, could be immense.
– The Taliban will work with the Kabul government and foreign countries to eliminate IS-K.
– The US will withdraw all combat forces and probably all aid workers too. Washington’s post-settlement influence will be confined to economic aid.
This agreement, should it come, conflicts glaringly with the vision of a democratic government and thriving economy advanced by the Bush administration in the heady, vengeful, and foolhardy days following the 9/11 attacks. However, it does offer a reasonably honorable exit from a costly, unwinnable war.
It might even benefit this US. The burden of Afghanistan will shift onto the backs of enemies. Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan will assume the problems of corruption, militancy, opium, and tribal bickering – perhaps for another 18 years, if not more.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.