Brian M Downing
The Afghan war is in its final stages. Districts and border crossings continue to fall to the Taliban and major cities are becoming cut off from one another. Local power holders see the Taliban as inevitable victors and feel pressed to settle with them. The Kabul politicians are not far behind.
In recent days the Taliban have moved on three cities – Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, and Herat. All are in the south and west, far from Kabul. What’s the strategy here? Will it work?
The cities, past and present
The Taliban have tried repeatedly to take major cities for years now. Taking a city requires a shift away from familiar guerrilla tactics and the adoption of more or less conventional ones. Heady rural commanders might not make the transition smoothly and might believe that their successes in the countryside ensure the same on urban battlegrounds.
Taking a city requires concentrating forces and that makes them vulnerable to artillery and air power, which can be devastating. Defenders are able to fight from tight defensive positions, usually close to logistical hubs.
Previous Taliban attacks failed. Parts of Kunduz fell but were swiftly retaken, usually by Afghan special forces. The Taliban are determined once more to take Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, and Herat. They want the prestige of conquering and holding major cities and the advantages of administrative structures and assets they contain. Kandahar was the Taliban’s capital in the 90s and they want it back now.
The military situation
Besieging three major cities in the south and west presents major problems for the Afghan National Army (ANA). The problems may be insurmountable and decisive.
Having lost thousands of troops from casualties and desertions, the ANA is stretched dangerously thin and responding to three major attacks may prove to be too much. ANA special forces, which have been bearing the brunt of the fighting and casualties in recent years, may be nearing exhaustion. If they have to be pulled back for refitting, or if sizable portions disintegrate, the end will be near.
ANA garrisons will have to be resupplied. Owing to corruption and ineptitude, logistics have always been a problem. Isolated garrisons have surrendered because they run out of supplies. Cities may have to do the same in coming weeks.
Air power has been critical to the stalemate of the last few years. US planes, drones, and choppers are heading out. The Taliban has been assassinating Afghan pilots. Afghan air power, like the army and special forces, will be stretched thin all the more and may be nearing exhaustion. Watch for pilots to fly away to neighboring countries.
Possible outcomes
It’s possible that the ANA, fighting from defensive positions and having air support, could hold the cities and inflict serious casualties on the Taliban. Kurdish forces did that to seemingly invincible ISIL forces at Kobane in 2014-15 and ISIL never regained the initiative. A Taliban defeat, however, would be only a setback, not a reversal.
Protracted sieges or collapse could force the Biden administration to rethink withdrawal of American air power and perhaps consider keeping a few battalions of combat troops to act as reaction forces. The aim will be short-term stabilization but the mission would never end.
If the ANA is unable to hold Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, and Herat, Kabul will probably withdraw whatever forces it can from the south and west thereby ceding a large amount of territory. Abandoning those areas and concentrating on Kabul and a few other cities in the east and north would make good military sense. (I suggested abandoning the west and south eleven years ago.)
The view here is that the Taliban will not try to take Kabul as that would alarm regional powers, including China, and endanger reconstruction aid. But taking major cities, especially Kandahar, will boost the their bargaining position in final talks – and devastate Kabul’s position.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.