Brian M Downing
Moscow and Washington vied for influence around the world in the first Cold War. They are doing the same in the second. In the first, the Soviet Union’s reach into the Gulf was limited. The USSR was atheistic, opposed to monarchy, and aligned with secular republics such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq which had overthrown monarchs.
Things have changed a great deal. Turkey’s hostility to Russia was strong for many centuries. The two powers are now cooperating in Syria, at the expense of American interests. The Gulf monarchies, including Saudi Arabia, are avid purchasers of Russian weaponry and sell copious amounts of their oil to Russia’s partner, China.
Russia and China see the United States as a declining power, and one that treated them poorly in the past – Russia, after the Soviet Union’s collapse; China, ever since the days of imperialist occupation. The two putatively aggrieved powers are cooperating to replace American hegemony with a Sino-Russian one. In a decade or so, the Persian Gulf may be shifting from the American sphere to that of its rivals. The contest has already begun.
Oil
The American presence in the Gulf began, unsurprisingly, with oil. US reserves were depleted during World War Two. Strategic thinkers thought that other countries’ oil should be developed after the war and American oil companies, already invested in Saudi Arabia, were hardly about to argue. Franklin Roosevelt and Abdul Aziz came to an agreement. US businesses would develop Saudi oil and the US military would defend the Kingdom and its allies.
In the next twenty years, as American suburbs and automobile production boomed, domestic oil production declined and imports went up. The US was tied to the Gulf.
Today, owing to greater efficiency and the fracking revolution, US oil production has skyrocketed and imports from the Gulf have plummeted. Demand for Gulf oil comes far more from Asia now, especially China. This dependency is bringing about greater comity between Beijing and Riyadh (and Tehran). China will seek to solidify relationships with vital trade partners.
Arms sales
The oil hikes of 1973 caused balance-of-trade problems for the US. The solution, according to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, was to convince 
oil-exporting countries to purchase more arms. Kings, emirs, and shahs bought avidly and legitimized their rule with displays of military might, almost always ceremonial ones.
American imports and exports had a stabilizing effect. With good relations in both Tehran and Riyadh, sectarian tensions rather low, and a common opposition to the Soviet Union and Iraq, Washington was able to maintain stability. The US built “twin pillars” in the Gulf.
After the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the close of the Iran-Iraq War (1988), Moscow began to sell copious amounts of military hardware to Tehran. MiGs and Sukhois replaced Tomcats and Phantoms. As the United States tried to draw nearer to Iran in recent years, and supported political reform movements in the region, the Sunni monarchies have increasingly bought weaponry from Russia and China. One pillar is gone, the other crumbling.
Political affinities
The importance of trade and the strictures of the Cold War caused Washington to overlook authoritarian governments and human rights issues. The Arab Spring movements brought reconsideration as Washington deemed harsh repression in, say, Bahrain and the military coup in Egypt as at least problematic.
They were violations of longstanding though only intermittently insisted upon human rights principles. Perhaps more importantly, they indicated a failure to understand the practical need for reforms in the modern world. The Trump administration is unlikely to insist on change but from the Gulf states’ view, the next president might return to the ideals of Carter and Obama.
Russia and China have no such inconsistency on political reform. Each has demonstrated steadfast support for firm and even harsh rule. Each has crushed dissent at home. Russian and Chinese political thought sees democracy as conducive to self-indulgent populations, directionless social change, moral decay, and political paralysis if not ruin. This resonates with the outlooks of Middle-Eastern rulers.
The princes look upon the Russian airstrikes on Aleppo with ambivalence. They killed and wounded thousands of fellow Sunnis and bolstered a Shia government, but Russia showed resolution in holding up an endangered ally. They know Americans will never help crush a jarring uprising in a Gulf city, but Russia will.
Twin pillars, redux
Sectarian hatreds are at the highest point in centuries. Proxy wars rage in Syria and Yemen. The US is no longer on good terms with the major opponents. Had the Iranian nuclear deal brought better ties with Washington, as the Obama administration hoped, the US might have been able to return to its moderating role. Iran, however, did not want better ties. Perhaps it calculated that the next administration would be hostile, perhaps it wanted to open the door to a greater Russian presence.
Riyadh and Tehran may reluctantly come to see the advantages of a different major power or alliance managing conflict. They may see greater security from helping, over the course of a decade or more, Russia and China increase their influence – and military presence – in the Gulf. Moscow and Beijing may already be stating the case.
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Undoubtedly, American strategic thinkers will oppose this. The US will be losing, or facing the diminution of, its mastery of a waterway through which much of the world’s oil flows. The shift would symbolize American decline and Chinese ascendance.
Looking decades ahead, the shift might not be as significant as think tanks and security bureaus will claim. The region’s oil may be less important than it is today as alternate energies proliferate and oil production elsewhere increases. Russia and China may find themselves holding far less a prize than they strived for and deeply mired in a region with a grim future of restive youth cohorts and faltering scepters.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs