Brian M Downing
The Islamic State’s fearsome offensive in northern and central Iraq has stalled owing to indigenous ground troops and western airpower. In some places, IS has been forced to retreat, beginning a new phase in its effort to bring unification to Muslims of the world, whether they want it or not. The jihadis will have to rethink their strategy, as will the many states aligned against them – especially in regard to the Sunni tribes of Iraq and Syria.
The situation in Iraq
IS troops made easy gains last June with the help of Sunni Iraqis. Sunni troops in the Baghdad army were persuaded to abandon their positions and allow the jihadis to sweep in, after which IS met with various measures of resistance from Kurds, Iraqi troops, and Shia militias. At least as important in halting the drive has been US airpower, recently bolstered by France, which prevents troop concentrations, reduces fixed positions, and interdicts supply convoys.
A vast Sunni tribal confederation has threatened to turn on IS, leaving them with indigenous support from only the remnants of Saddam’s officer corps and political organization. Thus far, the Sunni tribes have only skirmished with IS, for reasons to be addressed presently.
While IS troops are better disciplined and motivated than the ground troops arrayed against them in Iraq, they are badly outnumbered, perhaps twenty-five or more to one. Under constant pressure from ground and air, IS troops are no longer on the offensive and can no longer mass troops to launch a new one. They are instead mired in a war of attrition which they cannot win it.
Seizing the old caliphate capital Baghdad is no longer likely. Nor can IS seize and desecrate Shia holy sites, thereby igniting an immense regional conflagration out of which, in IS’s estimation, a new order would arise.
Options
IS has redeployed troops and tactical vehicles from Iraq across the unguarded border into Syria and launched an offensive in Syrian Kurdish lands (“Western Kurdistan” as Kurdish nationalists call it). It has met with considerable success.
This drive may be an effort to relieve pressure on positions in Iraq and hold the land conquered last June. This is unlikely to succeed. The Kurds are also able to shift forces into Syria and they are bolstered by an influx of fighters from Turkey and Iran. Furthermore, American and Arab airpower has recently begun attacking IS positions and convoys inside Syria, taking away IS’s ability concentrate troops and move from engagement to engagement.
IS may opt to retreat to Iraqi and Syrian cities. Indeed, US General Dempsey recently stated such a move has already begun. This will entail abandoning swathes of territory and shifting back to a car-bombing campaigns, especially in Shia parts of cities from Damascus to Baghdad. Allied airstrikes will be limited owing to the risks of large civilian casualties. However, many thousands of IS fighters cannot all be hidden in cities, and strongpoints and communications centers can still be destroyed.
From their urban redoubts jihadi leaders can gauge recruitment prospects and prepare the next move. There are signs that jihadis from Islamist groups in Yemen and Syria are seeking to join the seemingly ever-victorious army. Further, the formation of the US-led coalition may paradoxically aid IS recruitment. The coalition’s numbers, and the fanfare attending its creation, constitute an impressive diplomatic feat. However, the numbers and fanfare will increase hostility toward the West for its latest bout of intervention and toward rulers who are collaborating with the West. The coalition may unwittingly increase IS recruitment and undermine the legitimacy of Arab partners.
The Sunnis
The disposition of Sunni tribes in Iraq, and to a lesser extent Syria, will be critical in the war against IS. Neither the Kurds nor the Shia army dare operate in Sunni regions. The chief tribal confederation of western Iraq and eastern Syria has had an ever-changing relationship with foreign jihadis. Sunni tribes allied with them in the first years of the insurgency against the US invasion of 2003, turned on them in the short-lived Sunni Awakening, then again cooperated with them against the Shia government.
The confederation’s sheikh has announced an intent to fight IS, though actual fighting has been highly limited. The Sunni tribes’ request for arms directly from foreign powers has been blocked by the Shia government in Baghdad which sees such arms as a step toward Sunni independence. Further, Shia and Kurdish forces have been destroying the dwellings of Sunnis in towns and villages they retake from IS, seeking to send their former Sunni oppressors packing from Shia and Kurdish territory.
Islamist groups have been used by politicians before. The Yemeni government uses al Qaeda against Houthi rebels and southern secessionists; Pakistani generals have long used al Qaeda to advance their interests in Afghanistan and Indian-occupied Kashmir. The Sunnis of Iraq may continue using IS to advance their own, less grandiose goal. Sunni tribes do not seek Islamic unity or a new caliphate, only their own autonomy at the expense of Baghdad.
©2014 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst, author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam, and co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.