Brian M Downing
Islamist State forces have been blunted since their offensive into Iraq last summer. ISIL troops enjoy a considerable qualitative edge over the various Iraqi forces arrayed in front of them but are badly outnumbered by Iraqi army, Kurdish troops, Shia militias, and Sunni tribal fighters. ISIL has been rolled back at the Baiji refinery, Kobane in Syria, and a scores of smaller towns. As Josef Stalin is reputed to have said, “Quantity has a quality all its own.”
The opponents of ISIL are poised to launch a major offensive in coming weeks. Speculation is that ousting ISIL from Mosul in the Iraqi north is high on their list of objectives. However, the smaller, lesser known city of Sinjar may be the more judicious objective.
ISIL, eager to restore the aura of victory it won over the last two years, may opt to fight a major battle. Indeed, it may have no alternative. ISIL is unlikely to win a large-scale engagement – and its enemies should welcome as many such battles as possible.
Formula for allied success
The image of Iraqi and Kurdish troops has been shaped by poor showings against ISIL last summer. Both forces recovered from their ignominy and have been augmented by PKK fighters from Turkey and Shia militias trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers.
(IRGC trainers are an important force not only in Iraq but also in the region. They are responsible for the efficacy of Hisbollah units and the Shia-Alawi militias who helped turn the tide in the Syrian civil war.)
Iraqi forces are coordinating their efforts, gaining confidence, and enjoying the benefits of air support – mostly American. ISIL troops are operating chiefly in open terrain. Coordination between ground troops and allied airpower has improved since the summer. IS cannot send supply convoys or concentrate troops without risking detection and substantial casualties. In short, a large-scale battle will bring, if not certain defeat, then at least egregious casualties.
Mosul
Attention is focused on the northern city of Mosul as the next campaign in the ISIL War. Taken by ISIL last June, it is their largest and most prestigious holding in either Syria or Iraq. Losing it would be a serious blow.
However, Iraqi forces might find taking Mosul difficult and costly. Urban warfare offers decided advantages to defenders and IS has practiced bomb-makers and snipers. In protracted urban warfare, it may not be the Islamic State that suffers egregious casualties.
Furthermore, ISIL has at least a modicum of support from Mosul Sunnis. They were angered by Shia rule and have been further enraged by Shia and Kurdish policies in lands they’ve taken back from ISIL. Sunnis have had their dwellings seized or demolished by advancing Shia and Kurdish troops. They will not look upon Iraqi troops entering Mosul as liberators. Nor will they look upon IS troops as unequivocally as almost all outsiders do.
Sinjar
The northern town of Sinjar is a far more appealing place to strike at ISIL. Located 160 kms west of Mosul and 70 kms east of the Syrian border, the town straddles a critical supply line between the Syrian and Iraqi components of ISIL. Kurdish forces have taken the mountain heights just to the north and are likely to attempt to seize Sinjar in coming weeks. The population is chiefly Kurdish and Kurdish Yazidi who have felt ISIL’s harsh rule and those that have remained will greet the peshmerga as liberators.
ISIL cannot allow its forces to be cut off from one another. Supplies and reinforcements must reach over-extended troops. An army with only rudimentary organizational structures will be loth to allow local commanders the opportunity to operate on their own and break away from central command, such as it is. This prospect must be especially worrisome to ISIL leadership as its Iraqi forces rely substantially on former officers in Saddam’s army and state who are unlikely to share IS’s rather fanciful vision of a unified Middle East.
Cutting communication lines between Mosul and Syria, in or near Sinjar, will almost certainly force a large-scale battle. ISIL will have to mass troops drawn from Syria and/or northern Iraq, forcing it to weaken positions elsewhere. And of course, US drones, reconnaissance flights, satellites, and electronic surveillance systems will be on the watch, with fighter aircraft at the ready.
As Kurdish troops cut off ISIL’s supply routes near Sinjar, they will face relentless counterattacks. However, they will receive supplies and reinforcements via US airlift operations. In defensive positions, they can stand up against forces many times their numbers. The open desert terrain around Sinjar will be welcome for allied pilots in tactical air support missions. ISIL, then, may suffer serious casualties and still have its forces divided in two.
Alternately, it could, after considerable cost, reestablish control over Sinjar the supply route. This would not constitute a serious defeat for Kurdish troops. They could withdraw, for the time being, to the mountain heights to the north and continue to mount raids on the highway, thereby tying down large numbers of ISIL troops away from Syrian and Iraqi cities, and engaging them in protracted battles.
The formula for allied success in the ISIL War has been established at Baiji and Konane: numerically superior though not necessarily qualitatively impressive ground troops; ISIL troops forced to concentrate or withdraw; and unrelenting allied airstrikes. The pattern has been made clear at Haditha dam and Kobane. Sinjar will be a critical new case – and perhaps a serious defeat for the Islamic State.
(Copyright 2014 Brian M Downing)