The Iraqi army falters, again (Will the US army step up, again?)
Brian M Downing
The Iraqi army, despite being humiliated by ISIL in 2014, despite training and support from the US, has failed to develop into a competent fighting force. Whatever offensive capability it has shown has come not from the regular combat divisions, but from smaller special forces units. They took Ramadi last spring – a victory that led to hopes of retaking Mosul this summer.
But Ramadi did not bring continued success. The army failed south of Mosul and fell back on a more manageable objective of retaking Fallujah – a smaller city about fifty miles west of Baghdad and the site of fierce fighting between US troops and al Qaeda 10 years ago. The Iraqi army may be unable to play a major role in the ISIL War. Shia militias might take up the burden, but at a price of their increased power in national affairs. Military and political problems may cause Washington to further its escalation.
The Iraqi army
The US disbanded the Iraqi army shortly after taking Baghdad in 2003. A new one has been built over the years, but without the Sunni officer and NCO corps that had been the backbone of Saddam’s army. The new army is racked by corruption, inexperienced officers and NCO, tribal antagonisms, and sectarian mistrust where Sunnis remain in place. Commanders are aligned with political factions in the Green Zone.
Little wonder a rifle platoon isn’t sure that the units on its left and right can be relied upon, or that ammo, food, and water will be brought up to them from the rear in a timely manner.
The US stepped in with more trainers, special weapons such as anti-tank guns to use on ISIL truck bombers, and assistance with logistics and medical support. American artillery and aircraft respond swiftly to a unit in trouble and maintain a high profile to encourage Iraqi troops. Nonetheless, the Iraqi offensive south of Mosul was blunted. A smaller operation to retake Fallujah has encountered shockingly high casualties and has yet to encircle the city.
The Abadi government in Baghdad is reeling. It faces opposition from rival parties, popular anger over incompetence, and determined resistance from opponents of reform. Abadi’s hand would bet strengthened by a victory at Fallujah then Mosul. Defeat or continued stalemate or Pyrrhic victory could bring him down.
Shia militias
Under the tutelage of IRGC advisers, Shia militias fight well and have improved with experience. They were instrumental in blunting IISL’s 2014 offensive and in retaking Ramadi last spring. They are not, as often claimed, eager to synchronize their country with mullahs and generals in Tehran. Their loyalties are to scores of local mullahs and powerholders – and foremost to Moqtada al Sadr, the populist mullah based in Baghdad slums.
Though publicly supportive of Abadi and his reform agenda, and though benefiting from Iran, Sadr is loyal to neither. Above all else he is determined to increase the prestige and power of of Moqtada al Sadr. The US worries that Sadr loyalists are well represented in the Iraqi officer corps, even at the top.
His militias, not the Baghdad government, are assuming administrative control over territory retaken from ISIL. His militias intimidate and drive away Sunni populations, deepening sectarian animosities and probably driving many Sunnis into the ISIL camp, if only for a while.
Sadr, then, has built up not only a rival army but also a rival state. All the while he is making himself more important for the survival of the Abadi government. Presumably, he will continue amassing territory and influence until he can take power in Baghdad, legally or not.
American escalation?
Washington is alarmed by Iraq’s deterioration – the army, the government, Sadr’s ascendance, and ISIL. Army and state may become so paralyzed that Kurdistan will break free, the Sunnis will seek to do the same, and the oil-rich and reasonably coherent Shia south of Baghdad may break away from what was once Iraq. Large swathes of the rest of Iraq will be lawless or under ISIL rule, perhaps willingly.
Escalation of US involvement may be in the offing. The US has already increased the numbers of trainers, advisers, special forces, and artillery units. More units may be deployed to give tactical advice on the frontlines around Fallujah and Mosul, provide more artillery support, stabilize the Abadi government and limit the rise of Sadr and his militias. There are undoubtedly plans to deploy a division or more of ground combat troops to take Mosul.
Planners in Washington may see this as a short-term program, but this is wishful thinking. Political stability, sectarian hostility, Kurdish independence, and Islamist militancy are not matters the US or any coalition can manage. Sending in more troops will further mire them in those matters, probably for a decade or more, and invite another guerrilla war against Sunni and Shia bands.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.