Brian M Downing
Late last week President Trump ordered airstrikes on Iran in retaliation for attacks on a US drone and several foreign oil tankers. The reprisals were called off not long before launch. The president claims he canceled them because generals apprised him of sobering casualty estimates late in the day. This is implausible as such estimates are presented early on and clearly.
The generals are said to have expressed caution about retaliatory strikes, regardless of casualties. They are sober realists countering the ideologically-driven John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, and Jared Kushner. It will be recalled that Generals McMaster, Kelly, and Mattis were shown the door, in large part owing to opposition to the president’s Iran policy.
Armed conflict appears less likely than a week ago. The president is even speaking kindly toward Iran. However, his erratic nature and hawkish inner circle could bring us back to confrontation very swiftly. International diplomacy and domestic politics will be important in preventing this. One more than the other.
International diplomacy
The US had broad international support in pressing Iran to sign the JCPOA in 2015. Moscow and Beijing supported sanctions that brought the agreement, even though both are close to Tehran. The US effort today has no support outside the region. Not in Europe, not in South or East Asia. Countries in those regions do not believe claims that Iran is still pursuing nuclear weapons.
In recent weeks, Germany, Japan, and Qatar – American allies and home to US military bases – have been seeking a diplomatic solution. More recently, Britain has joined them.
Iran may indeed have conducted the recent attacks. They could be “plausibly denied” at a time when US credibility has reached a low point.
The attacks may have been intended to spur diplomatic efforts to ease tensions and deepen the divide between the US and its allies. This of course would be welcomed by Iran’s backers in Russia and China. From their perspective, Trump is weakening US power and strengthening theirs. Moscow and Beijing may have even helped draw up the stratagem.
Domestic politics
Despite the Constitution and War Powers Act (1973), presidents enjoy wide latitude in foreign policy, especially in military action. Sometimes they use this latitude judiciously, sometimes not. Domestic opposition to Trump’s Iran policy may be gelling, but it’s not quite there.
Trump is not a popular president. His unfavorable ratings are typically in the low fifties, approval is ten-to-fifteen points lower. The public is more concerned with domestic issues such as healthcare, abortion, and inequality. Confronting Iran conflicts with those priorities.
By the same token, however, the importance of the Iran policy is unlikely to become a major issue. Domestic issues seem more immediate than strikes in faraway lands. Attacking Iran presents no apparent cost. Most Americans do not know anyone in harm’s way and have had little connection to military service since Vietnam. The financial cost of launching an attack – say, a few billion dollars – is lost under a mountain of budget entries and incomprehensible debt.
Nor is the public concerned by foreign pressure to confront Iran. Saudi Arabia, the GCC states, and Israel are urging the US to up the ante, though not pushing many of their own chips forward. Assessment of US national interests does not fare well against reflexive support in Congress and appreciation of Saudi arms purchases.
International diplomacy may pose a substantial obstacle to renewed confrontation with Iran, but domestic politics presently do not. However, a presidential campaign is underway and some candidates, especially the handful of veterans, may try to make it an issue, if only to stand out in a crowded field.
As paradoxical as it may sound, our generals pose a more formidable obstacle to war with Iran than the Constitution, Congress, or the Democratic Party.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.