Brian M Downing
Political equilibrium
Afghanistan has never been a unified country with common beliefs, identity, and trust in national institutions – and it never will be. The country comprises a handful of sizable tribal confederations and ethnic groups and a slew of smaller ones who mistrust and often loathe each other. The present war is to some extent a conflict between the Pashtun of the south and the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Turkmen of the north.
The country’s longest periods of peace and prosperity came when a government in Kabul refrained from significant control over the country and interacted with various groups by strategically doling out money to them.
As Afghanistan is quite poor, the money that Kabul disbursed came from foreign powers – Britain in the 19th century, the Soviet Union in the next.
The arrangement was ramshackle, archaic, and went against everything the West has thought government should be since the rise of the nation-state hundreds of years ago. But it worked – as long as Kabul didn’t overreach its power and foreign powers sent money.
Disequilibrium
What led to the breakdown? The Kabul government of the late 70s, then financed by the Soviet Union, undid the equilibrium between state and localities by attempting to modernize the country. It enacted, or attempted to enact, reforms in education and landholding which though far from radical, nonetheless upset local powerholders.
Oddly, the Soviet Union, though not known for concern with local sensitivities, warned Kabul that the modernization effort was too ambitious and would bring opposition. Kabul chided its backers in Moscow and reminded them of how much Stalin had achieved in the 30s.
Kabul pressed ahead and destroyed the equilibrium. Uprisings broke out in many areas and army garrisons were besieged or driven out. All this was supported by the US.
Forty years of warfare deepened enmities between most tribal and ethnic groups. The US’s 20-year effort has made the Kabul government more corrupt, overreaching, and despised than ever.
Restoring equilibrium
The country today is devastated by war, internally divisive, and war-weary. Yet this may have set the stage for stabilizing the country and restoring the equilibrium between Kabul and the localities – not by the US, by China.
Beijing has developed a comfortable relationship with Kabul over the last twenty years. It has acquired rights to a good deal of the country’s iron, copper, oil, and rare earths. Though this has contributed to Kabul’s corruption it also makes Kabul amenable to China’s will, especially with the US heading out. No cooperation, no money.
Beijing can supply Kabul with the money to strategically disburse to rivalrous localities, which will use it as they see for for reconstruction. Money will go to Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, and Pashtun, including and perhaps especially Taliban. No cooperation, no money.
China’s allies
Russia and Iran have developed a modicum of influence with the Taliban over the years. Moscow has built ties with the Uzbek chieftain and his militia. Iran has long supported Tajik and Hazara leaders and their militias. Moscow and Tehran will press their allies to go along with the China-sponsored equilibrium with Kabul. No cooperation, no money.
Pakistan began supporting the Taliban in the early 90s when it saw them as a way to establish strategic depth and lucrative commerce with the ‘Stans. Since then, Pakistan has moved closer to China and further from the US. Pakistan can press the Taliban to accept the new equilibrium. No cooperation, no money. The Taliban recently announced that it saw China as a friend and one of its leaders visited Beijing this week.
China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan all want a stable Afghanistan, all have important allies there, and all want to benefit from the exploitation of the country’s resources. And all four want to embarrass the United States and demonstrate that a new global order is coming about in the region and elsewhere.
Furthermore, all four states have probably been working on this shift for several years.
Next: sources of instability in the new equilibrium
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.