The future of Afghanistan, part one: a restrained Taliban?

Brian M Downing

The Taliban are seizing district after district, border crossing after border crossing. Major cities are increasingly cut off from one another and sieges loom. Government forces are holding up only because of Afghan special forces and American airpower. The former are stretched thin and the latter are packing up.

A Taliban victory will come within six months but what form will it take? A worst case scenario has been given here with the Taliban taking Kabul and seizing the US embassy. However, the Taliban are signaling that they do not intend to conquer the whole country. They are amenable to the Kabul government though not with its present leader. All US troops must leave but a US presence can continue.

Or so they say. The Taliban cannot be taken at their word of course but there are compelling reasons why they would not try for total control. 

The Taliban in power, 1996-2001

The Taliban made sweeping gains following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal in 1988 and ensuing chaos but it never controlled the entire country. They realize today that they never will. Some people learn from their errors.

At the height of their power, the Taliban, a chiefly Pashtun movement, were never able to conquer the Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, and Turkmen populations of the north. Efforts to do so failed and led to unrest in their Pashtun homelands. Their people wearied of conscription, casualties, and the absence of reconstruction following the long Russian war. 

The same northern peoples who stalemated the Taliban twenty years ago are building militias to continue the fight in the event of Kabul’s collapse and a Taliban conquest. Aware of this, the Taliban have signaled a desire not to return to the fruitless war of the nineties. 

Foreign influence

Russia and Iran were on opposite sides in the Afghan war of the eighties. Russia was battling mujahideen forces some of which were aided by Iran. The world has turned many times since then. Both states oppose the US and have supported the Taliban for several years, albeit in a limited way.

Neither Russia nor Iran likes the Taliban. They are after all a Sunni extremist group similar to ones responsible for terrorism inside their borders and for massacres of Shia. Moscow and Tehran want to bleed the US but more importantly to gain influence with an inevitable winner in a country near its territory or areas deemed in its sphere – the Near Abroad in Russian strategic thought. 

They do not want a powerful Taliban government eager to align with Sunni and islamist groups in Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere in Central Asia. To underscore its concern, Russia has recently announced joint maneuvers with troops from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Further, they want the Taliban to contain or eradicate AQ and ISIL groups presently in Afghanistan.

Reconstruction 

The Taliban government of the nineties had neither the knowledge nor the money to adequately govern their territory. Insurgencies were popping up and their rule was endangered – a situation that made their expulsion in 2001 quite easy. 

They do not want to face the same situation in coming years and they will need massive international support. Most of the money will come from Russia, Iran, and especially China. 

Their support will have conditions. Foremost will be no international expansion and eradication of AQ and ISIL. China will of course insist on security for its considerable investments in Afghan natural resources – oil, copper, iron, and rare earths.

Next: China and the new rentier state in Kabul  

© 2021 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.