The battles in Baghdad and the future of Iraq
Brian M Downing
Just as Iraqi units were beginning to clear the approaches to Mosul and prepare to retake the city, the Baghdad government has fallen into crisis. Its reform efforts have stalled in parliament. Angry demonstrators broke into the heavily fortified Green Zone and took over the parliament building, before withdrawing.
The Green Zone has become, in the eyes of most Iraqis, a despised symbol of remote, squabbling, and incompetent politicians. Shia, Sunni, and Kurds can agree only on contempt for their elected officials. This does not augur well for the ISIL War or the future of Iraq.
The army and Mosul
The Iraqi army is not a professional organization with exacting standards for promotion and detachment from politics. Most high-ranking officers have attained their commands from political connections and bribes. Commanders and their units are aligned with Green Zone factions and are no more above politics than the retinue of ministers and tribal elders. It is as if some American divisions were commanded by GOP grandees and hangers-on, other divisions by Democratic ones, then all were sent off to war.
Militia units, which have been important in countering ISIL over the last year, are of course no more professional. They are a motley collection of motivated but indifferently trained civilians, often instructed by Iranian special forces, but more loyal to local religious and political figures than to tenants of the Green Zone or Tehran.
The army will likely delay – further delay – the Mosul operation. Commanders look behind them to Baghdad and ask if they will be replaced soon or have to defend Baghdad from further popular uprisings. Clashes between army units are possible.
ISIL responses
The Islamist army that once seemed invincible, especially to Iraqi soldiers, has been on its back foot in recent months. It has withdrawn many fighters to defend Mosul and increased its bombing campaign in Shia parts of cities.
ISIL will see opportunity in the political crisis. An increase in bombings will underscore the Green Zone’s incompetence, even in the most basic governmental function of protection. ISIL may launch spoiling attacks on Iraqi troops south of Mosul, hoping to break them and send them fleeing once again.
ISIL may target special forces troops. They have borne the brunt of the fighting and are still recuperating from the casualties from the Ramadi battle of months back. If special forces troops are broken, ISIL may regain the initiative. Intemperate, apocalyptic minds will see a reversal of fortunes at hand. So might less fevered outside observers; this could force the reintroduction of more American ground troops.
Holding together the government – and country
Though the Shia majority has supplanted the Sunni minority in government, the Shia are nonetheless riven by tribal and personal animosities. Without them, Saddam never would have been able to last as long as he did.
Iran may be helpful in restoring a stable government, though acknowledgment in the US is unlikely. Many of the Shia factions and militias were formed with Iranian help during the Iran-Iraq War of the eighties. Several years ago, as Shia factions fought each other, sometimes literally, Iran was able to pressure the antagonistic factions into forming a viable government. It is likely holding long sessions to repeat that success. The US will try to do the same with Shia factions favoring less alignment with Iran.
Without a reasonably stable government in Baghdad, army operations will suffer and the country may further disintegrate. The Kurds may declare independence. The Sunnis of western Iraq, mostly under ISIL rule now, may do the same. Open war with ISIL may bring outside support, specifically from Sunni monarchies and the West. Alternately, ISIL may rebrand itself as the defenders of the Sunni faith and seek to govern more through popular support, and less through brute force. (In recent months al Qaeda has taken this tack in Yemen and Syria.)
A less well known secessionist region is in the south. The region has few Shia and lots of oil. It might judge Iraq to be an unviable creation of imperial powers and see itself as becoming a stable oil-exporting mini-state, akin to Kuwait and Dubai. The south’s departure would reduce the rest of the country’s oil revenue, making it a lawless land of hostile warlords and tribal chieftains, much like what eastern Syria is now – or what has been here called Hobbesistan.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.