The battle of Raqqa – and Russia’s opportunity
Brian M Downing
The ISIL War is reaching an important junction. The Islamist movement has lost momentum and given up a lot of the territory which it claimed to be its caliphate. ISIL is bracing for major battles in Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria – the latter being its capital.
If both cities fall, ISIL’s claim to being the new caliphate will be less plausible to all but the most faithful. Isilstan will be mostly empty desert. It will be back to the underground network it was three years ago – a potent force but not one that threaten countries. ISIL’s capital of Raqaa is being approached by two armies. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces come from the north, the Russian- and Iranian-backed Syrian army press from the south.
The potential for clashes between the two armies is quite clear. The potential for intrigue and deal-making is less so, at least outside Moscow.
ISIL
As noted here many times, ISIL has fielded the best conventional army the region has seen. Though smaller than, say, the formidable Egyptian army, ISIL troops are fiercely determined. They have put to flight larger better-trained and better-equipped forces. Even after a string of losses, they fought to the last at Ramadi and are stymying the Iraqi army south of Mosul.
Following the loss of Palmyra, which was not deeply contested, ISIL troops are withdrawing to defend the approaches to Raqaa. Their cohesion and tenacity may be strengthening as the impending battle fits well with their apocalyptic creed. The final battles are coming. Raqqa now.
More practically, ISIL sees impending battles as opportunities to inflict catastrophic casualties on numerically superior but spiritless enemies. This in turn will break them and lead to a rapid reversal of fortunes. This is essentially how the Japanese army saw the impending invasion of the home islands. They were wrong. But ISIL is facing forces greatly inferior to those that Nimitz and MacArthur commanded. Breaking the Syrian army and rebel umbrella groups is not far-fetched. It is only unlikely, especially as they have almost unlimited air support.
The Syrian army et al
We have reasonably good insights into the morale and effectiveness of most armies in the region. The Syrian army, however, isn’t one of them. What we see is confined to obvious propaganda shots of cheering soldiers clad in implausibly clean uniforms. What aren’t we allowed to see?
Syrian troops have been fighting for many years, giving up a lot of territory, then retaking some of it. The prewar army contained large numbers of Sunni troops who, while motivated to face Israel, are unreliable in the sectarian war at hand. The number of trustworthy troops is unknown but likely much smaller than prewar levels.
Assad’s forces have had to be bolstered by Hisbollah militias, Syrian militias rapidly put into the fray by IRGC trainers, Shia militias recruited from Iraq and Afghanistan by the Iran, and most recently by a few battalions of IRGC ground troops. Russia deployed airpower into the region and stabilized the Syrian side, but the ground troops have been unable to turn the war around. Putin is thought to be disappointed by them, even the IRGC that Russian trainers supposedly whipped into an effective force after the Iran-Iraq War.
The Syrian Democratic Forces, Arabs and Kurds
Over the years the US has placed its support, and hopes, behind the Free Syrian Army, a group whose effectiveness fluctuates markedly, and behind a more recent group that disintegrated shortly after entering Syria and selling their weapons. Support now lies with the Syrian Democratic Forces, an umbrella organization of many groups, Arab and Kurd.
The SDF comprises a jumble of smaller groups and is affiliated with numerous others. Some of the latter have clashed with groups aligned with the CIA such as the Knights of Righteousness. One of the SDF commanders has ambitions to establish an emirate in Syria and Iraq before wheeling south to invade Saudi Arabia. The man has vision, just not one the US is prepared to support for long. The jumble is subject to fissures, command and control problems, and infighting.
The most reliable fighters in the SDF, are the Kurdish militias known the People’s Protection Units, or YPG. They have demonstrated courage and tenacity at Kobane where they delivered ISIL its first defeat, with the help of US airpower. But they are not loyal to the US.
Syrian Kurds are not as adamantly opposed to the Assad government as other rebel forces, and are hostile to the more Islamist rebel forces – that is, most of them. They are tied to the PKK, the Kurdish movement in Turkey that is again waging war with Ankara. Syrian and Turkish Kurds both enjoy support from Russia.
Russia
As the Raqqa fight nears, Russia’s intriguing position begins to appear. It backs the Syrian government, of course, but it also backs the Syrian Kurds. Russian aircraft has begun supporting them with airstrikes in recent weeks. Russia has tried, but thus far failed, to get Syrian Kurds represented in upcoming peace talks. Just this week, Moscow announced that it was “alarmed” by fighting between Turkish Kurds and the government, and that Ankara should abandon “the dead-end military method of resolving the Kurdish problem.”
Moscow is signaling support for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey – and probably in Syria as well. The US, while seeing a moral basis for Kurdish autonomy, and benefiting from Kurdish militias, is handcuffed to Turkey, a NATO partner and the provider of airbases and logistical hubs for operations in Syria. The Kurds of Syria will weigh their longterm strategic options as they close on Raqqa, and Moscow may seem more attractive than Washington.
Russia is positioned to shape the battle – and more. It has a great deal of influence with the Syrian army in the south and a good deal of it with the Kurds. The campaign may unfold along to Moscow’s plans than to Washington’s hopes, giving Putin greater prominence in the ISIL War and greater leverage in the region.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.