The Syrian offensive, backed by Russian airpower and Iranian ground troops, has finally made some gains, both in the south near Deraa and in the north near Aleppo. A major battle is shaping up around the latter. It remains to be seen if it indeed becomes a significant battle, or if the rebels opt to fight another day. If there is a major battle, there is potential for greater international involvement.
Government success
Last fall, with the arrival of Russian aircraft and IRGC troops, the Syrian government launched an offensive. It met with disappointment and high casualties. Rebel forces fought from defensive positions, and better weapons streamed in from the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Recent gains, especially those around Aleppo, have come after especially intense Russian airstrikes. Human rights groups report that civilian casualties have been high. Many Syrian cities are in ruins. Aleppo is one of them and it may become worse in coming months.
A rebel pullout?
A major battle for Aleppo will require a sizable and determined effort, by government and rebel troops. A government attack is all but assured; a rebel defense is not – especially once the battle is joined and Russian bombs rain down relentlessly on rebel positions.
Rebel factions in around Aleppo may see a major battle, win or lose, as inflicting serious or even devastating casualties on them, while fellow rebel factions remain safe in the rear. That is, more determined rebel groups may emerge gravely weakened compared to less determined ones – and to the more numerous government troops as well. It may be noted that the first Pyrrhic victory took place only a few hundred miles to the west.
Alternately, rebel groups may recognize they have no defense against Russian airstrikes and cannot adequately disperse in a fight for a limited area. They look upon ISIL defeats at Kobane and Ramadi and see little chance of winning. Withdrawal to hills, the countryside, and smaller towns is a less heroic decision, but the more judicious one.
A rebel fight?
However, the rebels may well see decisive battle as favoring them. International support for ISIL at Kobane and Ramadi was nonexistent. Resupply was difficult or impossible. Rebel forces, on the other hand, can call upon the almost limitless coffers and arsenals of the United States and the Sunni states. Special forces advisers may not be far away. Further, rebel forces are more numerous than the thousand or so ISIL fighters who defended Ramadi.
Rebel forces and international backers may see a major battle as an opportunity to inflict egregious casualties on weary government troops, and to coax 
Damascus to send in more and more troops into a Stalingrad-like battle. Other attractions include the potential for forcing Iran, Hisbollah, and perhaps even Russia to send in fresh troops. Saudi Arabia will be especially eager to see this as the war is to them a proxy war against Russia and especially Iran.
Outside Aleppo
A battle for Aleppo will be shaped by events away from the battlefield. New weapons will be delivered to groups throughout Syria. Foreign powers may intervene or threaten to.
Backers may relent on longstanding reservations and deliver portable surface-to-air missiles, Manpads, to rebels. These can be effective on low-flying helicopters and force fighter aircraft to release payloads at higher altitudes, reducing accuracy.
Turkey, the US, and Israel are capable of intercepting Russian fighter aircraft and cratering their airstrips along the Mediterranean coast. Indeed, each of those powers is capable of devastating Russian airpower in a matter of weeks. This move will have swift if incalculable consequences from an embarrassed and angered President Putin who has staked much on foreign policy feats.
Spoiling attacks may force Damascus to relocate troops from Aleppo. Turkey could easily send a full division across the frontier in the name of establishing a safe haven for refugees, many of whom are streaming from Aleppo now.
Saudi Arabia has announced its readiness to intervene with ground troops, under certain circumstances, though its forces are not considered very effective. Still, mechanized units stationed in the north of the Kingdom could cross into Jordan, with Amman’s permission, and mass along the Syrian border, seventy-five miles from Damascus.
Israel does not want to see a Shia victory at Aleppo. While it is unlikely to cross into Syria (or Shia Lebanon), it may encourage rebels in southern Syria to mount a spoiling attack in the direction of Deraa and Damascus. Israeli airpower would be of greater tactical help than that of Russia.
There is hope that Aleppo will be a decisive battle in the war, one that leads to a swift settlement. However, the engagement might be a protracted, bloody stalemate, with each side upping its commitment. It might be recalled that the battle of Verdun took place two years before the armistice of 1918, and Stalingrad two years before the Third Reich fell.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. He served in the army for three years, including one tour in Vietnam.