Brian M Downing
This week, Russia launched an offensive in the Donbas. It surprised no one. The Kremlin announced that it was shifting to the east and even claimed, if unconvincingly, that control of the region was the principal war aim. Why has the drive come so shortly after the Kyiv debacle?
The offensive began a week or so sooner than thought here but Russian generals aren’t regular readers. Many BTGs took heavy losses from hostile fire and the elements in the northern drives and very much needed time to rest and work in new soldiers. They weren’t granted it.
Putin has shown little expertise on military matters and no capacity for empathizing with others, not even his own soldiers. He expects them to turn the the tide quickly and bring him the victory that will assure his place alongside Dmitri Donskoi, Alexander Nevsky, and Joseph Stalin. Didn’t they drive their soldiers onward despite hardship and adversity? Didn’t they win great victories over foreign hosts? Moscow, however, must convince its beleaguered soldiers of this.
The generals feel the heat. They know that failure will bring enduring disgrace, additional purges, and perhaps plots against the throne from fellow high-ranking officers. Disciplinary trouble may spread in the ranks. Whole BTGs may break down. A few might revolt against their officers, as the Potemkin crew did in the Black Sea during the war with Japan. The mutiny was long ago but it was impressed on Russians, of all stations, by Eisenstein’s film and Soviet texts. It was presented as a precursor to the end of the old regime.
Pressure for the offensive had a military basis as well. Moscow knows that Ukrainian forces are receiving more howitzers, armor, MANPADs, and antitank weapons by the day. The startling influx can’t be stopped. Nor can it be matched. Much of the equipment features state-of-the-art technology that Russians haven’t been able to copy yet. They must wonder what the Phoenix Ghost is – as do most of us.
Russian forces must rely on the material at hand, most of which was shoddily made and poorly maintained. Replenishment is uncertain owing to logistical incompetence. More sophisticated gear is out of the question. Russian industry isn’t nimble or creative. It can’t even get semiconductors for existing systems anymore. Sanctions have seen to that.
Russian generals were driven to act quickly and probably unwisely to save the war, their country, and their necks. They must see the early results of the offensive are unpromising.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.