Two months ago, after a string of defeats in both Syria and Iraq, ISIL seized control of Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s Sunni-dominated Anbar province. The fall of Ramadi once again underscores the power of ISIL and the weakness of the Iraqi army. The expected counterattack, to the surprise of few, met with delays, but is now underway. Several military forces are taking part, and each has strengths and weaknesses.
The Brothers of the Sword
The troops of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are the most effective conventional force the region has seen in decades if not centuries. Their Salafist creed – an exceptionally militant offshoot of Saudi Wahhabism – transcends the tribal and regional rivalries that weaken most Middle Eastern armies. Recruits eagerly become soldiers in a warrior cult engaged in an apocalyptic cause. Impressive victories anneal their faith and promise a glorious denouement in coming years. They find appealing beauty and terror in a line from Islamic apocrypha, “Behold! God sent me with a sword, just before the Hour, and placed my daily sustenance beneath the shadow of my spear.”
The disposition of Iraqi Sunnis toward ISIL is unclear; for all too obvious reasons, few journalists venture into Isilstan. Most Sunnis despise the Shia government in Baghdad, which they see as an imposition of western armies and a confederate of foreign “Persians.” However, ISIL government, harsh and foreign in its own way, conflicts with established tribal authorities and with moderate religious traditions. Sunni dispositions will be critical.
ISIL’s qualitative superiority is not, however, matched with a quantitative one. The highest estimate of their numbers, in both Syria and Iraq, is thirty thousand. (It might be noted that high estimates often gain more attraction than they merit.) Aligned against them, though with varying levels of determination, are Kurdish peshmergas, Shia militias, the Iraqi army, and a slew of forces just to the west in Syria. In Ramadi, ISIL has prepared fortified positions, observation posts, snipers, and hundreds of mines and booby traps.
Iraqi forces
The most effective troops fighting ISIL are the Kurdish peshmergas – the descendants of guerrilla bands that fought Saddam Hussein and many others over the decades. They are making the difficult transition from guerrilla bands that attack then retreat to mountain havens, to conventional forces that must defend an established country.
The Kurds will remain well north of Ramadi but may play a role in the campaign by attacking ISIL positions and preventing them from reinforcing positions near Ramadi. Kurdish troops in Syria are already putting pressure on ISIL there. Iraqi Kurds may call for concessions from Baghdad during the war, perhaps demanding the right to sell their oil without sharing revenue, perhaps demanding outright independence.
The Iraqi army, like most armies of the region, is weakened by tribal factionalism and corruption in the selection of officers. The dissolution of the army in 2003 and its reconstruction from scratch – minus the Sunni officer and NCO corps – hardly helped. Frail governments and strong armies do not always coexist for long. Hence the government’s strategic selections for the officer corps is not merely a matter of venality; it is an effort to prevent a coup. No politician of the region can be unmindful that many regimes around them came to power by military coups. More than a few colonels and generals are likely mindful.
The army has performed badly at Mosul and Ramadi, but there are several effective units, especially in the special forces. They will be put to the test in coming months. The humiliation of past battles may serve to instill a measure of tenacity.
Shia militias have performed better. Trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guard cadres and energized by sectarian identities, the militias performed well in defending the approaches to Baghdad and in retaking Tikrit. Their sectarianism, however, is a liability as they enter the more Sunni regions of Anbar. As they near Ramadi, their reputation for rough treatment of Sunnis will precede them. Many Sunnis will see oncoming force less as liberators than as harbingers of renewed Shia oppression, if not of ethnic cleansing.
Of particular importance will be the performance of Sunni militias of Anbar. Despite promises by tribal leaders to battle ISIL, little has come of it, with only a few tribes fighting, usually from enclaves in Anbar – towns and military bases. The US has recently built a larger training program and Ramadi will be a test. Sunni fighters may be best used in harassing ISIL convoys bringing troops and supplies to the battle site and in allaying the concerns of locals that liberation means renewed Shia oppression.
Despite shared interests in Iraq and prospects of rapprochement, the US and Iran diligently avoid any appearance of cooperation. They will support the Ramadi campaign with training missions and probably with air support. The latter will be critical as ISIL will be fighting in numbers and from fortified positions, thereby providing scores of targets. Airstrikes will be more effective if directed by American personnel serving alongside Iraqi forces – a prospect suggested by General Dempsey in recent congressional testimony.
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Numerical superiority and airpower will likely win out over ISIS’s qualitative advantage, even with the latter’s receiving appreciable help from locals. The significance of the battle for Ramadi will be important in testing the capacity of various Iraqi forces, but more importantly it will reveal the the disposition of the Sunni population. Will they see the various Iraqi forces as a welcome change, or will they see ISIL, with various levels of reluctance, as the defender of Sunni dignity and autonomy?
© 2015 Brian M Downing