Brian M Downing
In recent weeks Qatar has hosted talks to bring the American phase of the Afghan conflict to an end. President Trump has said there should be a US troop cut by December. Nonetheless, the Taliban have besieged Lashkar Gah, the capital of the southern province of Helmand. It’s not the sort of move that conveys the insurgents’ bona fides.
Objectives
The fall of Lashkar Gah would greatly boost the Taliban’s power prestige at the talks. The ready analogy is to French Indochina War in 1954 when the Geneva talks opened just after the Viet Minh took the French bastion at Dien Bien Phu. France left Indochina shortly thereafter and the US picked up the burden.
Any settlement will grant the Taliban large parts of the south and east which they will govern with a good deal of money and very little oversight from Kabul. Lashkar Gah would be a capital – far more prestigious and useful than the scores of smaller towns the Taliban hold now.
The Taliban might be convinced that taking Lashkar Gah would be a crushing defeat for the Afghan National Army. Morale would drop, who battalions would go home or switch sides.
Lashkar Gah’s fall might also convince Washington to throw in the towel and get out as fast as possible before more cities fall. That’s a dubious argument with any figure in the White House.
Counterforces
The Taliban have besieged major cities before. Kunduz in the north was one case. Lashkar Gah was surrounded and attacked four years ago. Both efforts failed.
In order to take a large target, attacking forces make themselves vulnerable. In the present war, that means shifting from shadowy guerrilla tactics and adopting more or less conventional ones. Troops must concentrate as they take up positions around the objective and strike surrounding outposts. They can be detected by aerial surveillance and ground observers and pounded by airpower and artillery. That was the case of the North Vietnamese siege of the marine base at Khe Sanh in 1968 and ISIL’s effort to take the Kurdish city of Kobane in 2014. Both forces took egregious casualties and lost the initiative.
Furthermore, Taliban troop concentrations have to face Afghan special forces who will be airlifted in to prevent defeat. They are far better than the bulk of the ANA and will have American advisors.
In some cases, the US has gathered a few hundred special forces advisors into a makeshift battalion. Though they do not have experience fighting together, they have an exceptional sense of camaraderie, masterful tactical knowledge, and an adaptable command structure that makes them a formidable combat unit.
The move on Lashkar Gah, then, seems like a bad move, perhaps even folly. It would make more sense if Taliban troops made moves on other major targets. This might overstretch the ANA and American assets.
The Lashkar Gah siege might cause a mercurial Donald Trump to speed the pullout but it might just as likely cause him to break off talks and hit back hard on Taliban troop concentrations and a host of targets in Taliban hands. The president may feel this will boost his popularity at home and demonstrate his resolve abroad.
The view here, put forth more than once, is that Afghanistan war is unwinnable. That’s been clear for the last decade but no president wanted to risk the embarrassment of pulling out and facing the consequences. Withdrawal would be painful and embarrassing but it might bring important gains.
Washington could inform Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran that the US is pulling its troops out and curtailing funds to the Kabul government. The Taliban and the irremediably corrupt Kabul government will be in the hands of those four powers, at least three of which have been aiding the Taliban for years. The war and radical Islam will be in their backyards. It will be their war, their money, and their troops – perhaps for more than nineteen years.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.