The al Nusrah Front breaks from al Qaeda – and aligns with what?
Brian M Downing
The al Nusrah Front has long been one of the most formidable rebel groups in Syrian civil war. Its Salafi creed establishes cohesion in combat units, respect for its chain of command, and an effective logistical system that has the uncanny ability of getting its hands on newly arrived weaponry designated for other rebel groups.
Yesterday, in a rare appearance by its leader, al Nusrah announced a break with al Qaeda. The latter never had meaningful control over its affiliates ranging from West Africa to Southeast Asia. It did not fund them, train them, or direct campaigns.
ISIL broke away two years ago. Parts of Somalia’s al Shabab have too. The once vaunted al Qaeda is losing importance. But is the departure of al Nusrah, now renamed the Front for the Liberation of the Levant, just a ploy to get relief from western and Russian airstrikes? Or is it something more portentous?
Foreign support
One of the reasons the Syrian war has become so bitter and complicated is that numerous foreign powers back scores of rebel bands. Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia all fund and arm rebel groups. Israel too is in the fray just to its northeast.
Unsurprisingly, foreign powers have tried to gain influence with a fighting force as remarkable as al Nusrah. They have offered it money, arms, and air support in the hope it would moderate itself and become a less reprehensible instrument of foreign policy. Central to the aims of Saudi Arabia and Israel is making al Nusrah a reliable weapon against what remains of Shia Syria, Hisbollah, and Iran. This rebranding is part of a process of rehabilitating al Nusrah.
Breaking with al Qaeda will not immediately make the new Front less detestable to most outside powers. The US and Russia have not altered their operations against it. That will take time. The new Front does, however, have Saudi Arabia on its side for now.
Local government
Over the last year, al Nusrah has changed its methods of control. It no longer relies chiefly on terror and brute force to control its territories; it has shifted to administering utilities, medical facilities, and education. It has changed, to some extent, from marauding band to local government.
How many locals see it that way is impossible to discern. How effective the rebranded al Qaeda band will be in preventing its troops from reverting to old ways is also unclear. The countenance of the new Front’s leader seems to promise a new day.
The stalemated war has caused most warlords to abandon hopes of taking Damascus and ruling all of Syria. They are looking ahead, if only reluctantly and temporarily, to a new region in which Damascus (and Baghdad) no longer control their countries, and where a welter of statelets will take their place. The best fighters with the most foreign support will form the strongest and most enduring of those statelets.
Looking to the east
A rebranded Front may be of use to foreign powers outside of Syria. ISIL retains control of much of western Iraq. The combination of Iraqi special forces, Kurdish militias, and American airpower are steadily expelling ISIL from the territory it seized in 2014.
The fall of Mosul may come in a few months and while welcome, it will present tremendous problems. As ISIL retreats, Iraqi and Kurdish troops have been heavy-handed with local Sunnis, accusing them of collaborating with ISIL, and often driving them from their homes.
Sunni tribal leaders, and their private militias, will fight to prevent the Shia government in Baghdad from again ruling the vast Anbar province in western Iraq. Locals will help them regain Sunni land and dignity. Foreign help may be coming.
Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Israel, share an interest in minimizing Shia power – in Syria and Iraq. Permanently breaking the Shia Crescent stretching from Iran to Lebanon and Syria would be a major achievement for the House of Saud. A rebranded militant group, one with a loathsome past and a dubious future, and controlling lands in what was once Syria and Iraq, will be helpful. The Sunnis of Anbar will be grateful.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.