The Afghan War is seasonal. Most ground fighting takes place from spring to early winter, after which intermittent bombings and terrorist strikes occur. The Taliban showed considerable strength in this year’s fighting season, more than thought possible by many observers (yes, including me).
The Taliban nonetheless face critical fissures that threaten its ability to continue as a unified force. Indeed, the fissures may have limited its potent 2015 offensive.
The north
The northern province of Kunduz has long attracted the Taliban. Kunduz has a sizable Pashtun population, which is rare in the north. Critical US supply routes run through it. And oil and gas assets are being developed there. In recent years the Taliban fought and defeated Hisb-i-Islami, a rival Pashtun insurgent group, before turning their attention on government positions.
The Taliban over the last few years were able to garner local support in Kunduz which has allowed them to move troops and supplies through the province without alerting Afghan intelligence. This enabled them to attack Kunduz city and hold key parts of it for several days. The Afghan army garrisons in Kunduz city failed to put up much resistance and the northern Afghan town seemed about to repeat the example of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, where ISIL ran off Iraqi garrisons and seized control.
Unlike the Iraqi case, the Afghan army was able to dispatch competent troops to the city. The operation was plagued with hesitance and ineptitude according to an after-action study, but it did drive the Taliban from the city – with considerable help from American advisers and airstrikes.
The south
Shortly afterwards, the Taliban launched sizable offensives in the south and east. Like the Kunduz attack, neither was able to hold on to significant territory, and both were repelled with the help of US airpower.
Given that the Afghan army comprises mostly middling quality units backed by a smaller number of effective units used as reaction forces, it is puzzling why the Taliban did not launch simultaneous attacks in the north, south, and east. This could have broken several low-quality units and put tremendous strain on the limited number of reaction forces.
The Taliban should have been able to launch concerted attacks. They have effective communication systems and heretofore have demonstrated a fairly unified command structure running from the shura councils across the frontier in Pakistan to regional commanders.
Divisions
The unity of the Taliban is very much in doubt now. The death of its leader Mullah Omar was hidden for two years, and succession has not gone smoothly. A breakaway movement is ensconced in the southwest and skirmishes between the Taliban factions have been reported.
ISIL constitutes another fissure in the insurgency. The rogue al Qaeda affiliate has the attraction of spectacular victory which contrasts to the more plodding gains of the Taliban over the years. ISIL may win support from Taliban groups disenchanted with the current leadership, from the miscellany of internationally-oriented groups in eastern Afghanistan (al Qaeda, Lashkar-i-Taiba), and from the Pakistani Taliban just across the frontier. Longer term, the countries to Afghanistan’s north – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan – are worrisome. Thousands of their men are serving with ISIL and AQ in Syria and Iraq.
The loss of unity in the Taliban presents opportunities to the Kabul government and the US. The Taliban may be offered autonomy in parts of the south and east in exchange for their cooperation in fighting ISIL, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Alternately, more Machiavelli-like, Kabul may encourage Taliban factions to fight each other, much as Baghdad is encouraging Kurdish factions to fight each other.
The US
Clearly, the US will have to abandon any thought of leaving Afghanistan in the near future. The Afghan army relies too heavily on US trainers, advisers, and airpower, and internecine fighting within insurgent forces has not yet appeared.
Looking back on the 2015 fighting season, it’s clear that much of the Afghan army is not equal to the task of fighting concentrated Taliban forces, and that the reaction forces may soon be worn down and overstretched as they respond to hot spots across the country. If the reaction forces fail, the army may collapse.
Accordingly, the US may consider deploying its own reaction force – rangers, SEALs – as it is already doing in Iraq. It is likely already making plans.
©2015 Brian M Downing
Brian,
I never considered the “Taliban” a unified force but an organization made up of many locally unified forces that we, the west, tended to call the Taliban…in much the same way the mujahidin were “organized”…and that was why they could never be defeated. You might get one small group but it would have no effect on the others. And this disunification was also why they could never come together for major battles, like Jalalabad with the mujahidin, but the Taliban did get enough people together to get Kunduz, briefly. Maybe that had to do with that concentration of Pashtuns in Kunduz, from which Hikmatyar came, in the middle of all those non-Pashtuns. And maybe they understand that if they unify for a big battle they can be destroyed by the air attacks.
I agree that whatever unity the Taliban have is based on opposition to the presence of foreign troops. Nonetheless, I think they are, or were, capable of attacking in the north, south, and east at more or less the same time, which is more than the anti-Soviet mujahideen could do. The mujahideen fought each other a great deal. Infighting in the Taliban is new. Maybe infighting will bring more infighting.
I also agree that massed Taliban forces will be devastated by airpower – US airpower. That’s why I think the US presence will go on for years or decades. Add in a few hundred SF troops as a response force.