Brian M Downing
Thus far the Iranian uprising has apparently not led to weakened repressive capacity, divisions in the elite, or opposition in parliament (Majles). This doesn’t bode well. However, separatist movements, terrorism, and foreign pressures may cause deeper problems for the mullahs and generals.
Intensified separatism
Iran is ruled by Persians who form about 61% of the population. The rest have varying levels of discomfort and opposition. Some have engaged in low-level insurgency for many years. The present turmoil may encourage bolder opposition – and put further strain on government forces.
The Kurds are about 10% of the population and have resented Tehran’s rule since the days of the shahs. More recently, they’ve been waging a low-level guerrilla campaign in the northwest, probably seeking regional autonomy rather than full independence which though desirable seemed out of reach. Mahsa Amini, whose resistance to the hijab edict and ensuing death brought about the ongoing uprising, was a Kurd.
Just to the east are the Azeris, some 16% of the population, who feel marginalized by Persians. Spending on economic development is less generous in Azeri lands than elsewhere. The Supreme Leader is half Azeri but this is of little relevance to the aggrieved.
In the southeast are the Balochs. Discontent is exacerbated by Shia condescension toward their Sunni faith. They are only 2% of the population but their sparsely populated area is vast and in recent years the state has moved in to develop the region’s resources. Balochs have attacked IRGC troops over the tears and paid the price. Balochs are prominent in the ongoing uprising and reportedly, some 80 were killed in a recent crackdown.
Urban unrest could force local officials and repressive assets to flee, leaving government in the hands of revolutionary councils. The fall of one or two towns would have little consequence. A dozen or so sizable cities free of the regime’s grasp would encourage stronger opposition, further tax regime forces, attach more legitimacy to the opposition, and provide the basis for armed militias.
Terrorism
Iran has had terrorist groups since before the Khomeini revolution of 1979. The Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) formed in the sixties as a Marxist-Leninist opposition to the Pahlavi government. It used to target Americans as well. The MEK has developed into a violent anti-regime cult that has carried out many successful attacks over the years.
Arab groups seeking autonomy for oil-rich Khuzestan have assassinated IRGC officers. (Iran has countered by killing its leader in Europe.) ISIL has a small presence. It has two notable attacks in recent years – one of them last week in the southwestern city of Shiraz. Its goal would be to bring about chaos which would allow a new caliphate to rise.
Foreign powers
Terrorist groups have considerable foreign backing. The MEK was taken off the US State Dept’s terror list and housed near a US base in Albania. Israel and Saudi Arabia have aided it in assassinating Iranian scientists and striking IRGC sites. ISIL is usually deemed a band of independent jihadis but it has had occasional ties to Saudi and Emirati intelligence. They seek to channel ISIL away from the Sunni princes and direct them against the Assad government and other enemies.
With Iran in turmoil, foreign support to violent groups is likely to intensify. Iran’s sale of drones and missiles to Russia for use on Ukrainian cities may lead to US support to clandestine groups. The Saudis, Emiratis, Israelis, and at times the US have hoped to break Iran into pieces, as with Yemen, Libya, and Syria. (Israel has increased its attacks on Iranian positions in Syria.) A weakened government in Tehran and a slew of emboldened separatists and terrorists could bring that about, though breakup is far from the thoughts of most protesters in the streets tonight.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.