Brian M Downing
The effort to oust the Assad government is all but over. The US and Turkey are still occupying swathes of the north and east, Idlib remains in rebel hands for now, but Damascus has clearly won. Nonetheless, the US has imposed stricter sanctions on Syria. Foreign countries are steering clear to avoid sanctions themselves. The Syrian economy is plummeting.
The US insists the sanctions are for war crimes. There’s undoubtedly blood on Assad’s hands but what’s the point of sanctions now? There’s no new rebel offensive coming. No outside forces are about to invade. Paradoxically, or appropriately, the war is coming full circle to the international politics at its outset.
The Sunni-Shia conflict
In 2011, when Syria was beset by widespread protest but not yet by civil war, Saudi Arabia and the UAE tried to convince Assad to break with Iran. That would be a major blow to Iran and an important step toward Saudi dominance of the Middle East. Syria would benefit from their largesse – and avoid their wrath. Israel, eager to weaken Hisbollah, supported the Sunnis.
But Assad refused and Sunni money poured in to rebel forces, including hardline Islamist groups. Syria found considerable support from Hisbollah, Iran, international Shia militias, and of course Russia. Victory was costly and the country is now in ruins.
The Saudis and UAE have a second, and perhaps better opportunity to convince Assad to turn against Iran. It would bring considerable advantages from several quarters. The Emiratis are taking the lead, as they did in 2011.
The US sanctions would ease as Iranian troops march back east. Trade and investment would return. American forces would withdraw from the east and the oil fields there would revert to Damascus’s hands. Israel would end its strikes inside the country. Perhaps most importantly, vast amounts of Saudi and Emirati reconstruction aid would flow in and Syria would be part of a Sunni co-prosperity sphere.
All Assad has to do is order Iranian troops out, end trade and military cooperation, and leave Hisbollah to wither on the vines of the Beqaa Valley.
The view from Damascus
The benefits seem to greatly outweigh the costs, at least from the outside. However, the army, state, and economy are dominated by an Alawi-Shia minority who have presided, often precariously, over an overwhelmingly Sunni population. In recent years the minority has bombed, gassed, tortured, and massacred Sunnis, leaving a yearning for vengeance that will persist for generations.
The Alawi rulers must realize that joining the Sunni camp would inevitably bring privileges and power to the majority. In a decade or two, Alawi power would be in danger. This time, they could not rely on Iranian help and Hisbollah, effectively cut off from allies, would be far weaker.
The view from Moscow
Russia is in an interesting position. Its military presence is growing in Syria and Libya and Moscow has its sights on the Persian Gulf.
Currying favor with the Saudis and Emiratis would be most helpful. The billions of petrodollars that today flow into the US economy could breathe new life into the Russian economy. Russia would also love to see the US presence in the Persian Gulf decline and its own (and China’s) rise.
Israel has considerable influence with Russia. Its hi-tech goes to Russia and its oil and gas fields are being developed by Russian firms. Israel has already convinced Russia to refuse to upgrade Syria’s air defenses, giving the IDF easy work in attacking Iranian and Hisbollah positions. It’s working with Saudi Arabia to convince Russia to get Iran out of Syria and to urge Assad to move into the Sunni sphere.
This would not necessarily mean abandoning Iran. Moscow may reason it can skillfully establish good ties with both Sunni and Shia camps. It can mediate the conflict, keep both sides in check, and in time replace the US as the dominant outside power and arms provider in-chief.
There’s another complication. Russia must also contend with Ankara’s interests. Turkey, like many countries, is concerned with the prospect of Saudi hegemony and vehemently opposes a Syrian shift toward the Gulf states.
Moscow’s effort to win friends in the Middle East and weaken the US is an intriguing effort. But it’s placing itself in the middle of several contradictory pressures. Some are from old allies like Syria and Iran, others from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel – the prizes in Cold War Two.
The effort’s objectives may be out of reach and shortsighted too. The view here is that in a few decades the Middle East will be of little strategic import and mastery of the region will present more problems than benefits. Russian troops in Syria and elsewhere may become the targets of resentful locals and disappointed neighboring states.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.