Brian M Downing
The IRGC has several ways to increase its power at the expense of the mullahs. Again, the scenario suggested here isn’t a coup. The mullahs have far too much popular and institutional power for that. But the generals can establish a formidable power bloc comprising military, economic, and political institutions and convert the country from a theocracy defended by an elite military to a national security state legitimized by a weaker clergy.
Economic power
The IRGC, like armies in Egypt and Pakistan, own or have considerable stakes in a slew of businesses. There is no clear demarcation between the IRGC and the private sector. Today, IRGC hands are in oil and gas, shipping, engineering and construction, banking, port operations, telecommunications, publishing, and news outlets. Want laser eye surgery? An IRGC clinic will accommodate you.
The generals are positioned to expand their presence in the national economy and present themselves as munificent providers of growth and employment. This all the more so as Iran will likely experience substantial growth once sanctions are lifted in 2021. Naturally, the IRGC will take credit for it – and for standing up to the US over the years.
There are problems. The IRGC can become sprawling and ignobly corporate. It can also be reminiscent of, if not clearly closely tied to, China – a country that’s clearly on the rise but just as clearly insensitive toward lesser peoples and cruelly oppressive toward Muslims.
Populist militarism
Economic prestige is important but it’s dry, soulless, and lacking in spiritual appeal which traditionalist people yearn for. The Russian thinker Alexander Herzen noted the problem in his country’s middle classes as they vied for power with the aristocracy: “You cannot replace the dogma of patriotism, the tradition of courage, and the shrine of honor by the rules of political economy.”
The generals are positioned to anneal economic power with military prestige – the strongest and most enduring basis of legitimacy as Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon well knew. Tehran and other cities are filled with monuments, fountains, and murals commemorating the IRGC’s religious and patriotic fervor in the costly Iraq war. It isn’t really true and the regular army and many veterans resent the claims, but the propaganda mills are hard at work and the pious are credulous.
The IRGC points to its success in holding up Syria against the combined effort of several enemies. The Houthis of North Yemen are holding their own against many of the same foes. At home, the IRGC is battling terrorists supported from abroad. Notable failures in recent years only underscore the need for strong vigilance.
The IRGC is defending the Shia faith from Sunni and other enemies, perhaps more so than any other part of the nation. Their devotion and martyrdom place them symbolically alongside the most revered clerics operating well behind the frontlines and well ahead of the new generation of clerics coming up under Khamenei. And there’s something more compelling about valor in war than expertise in sharia.
Electoral politics
The generals are wary of the modicum of representative government in Iran’s constitution. Elections cannot always be controlled. Parliament can be a forum for seditious speech. Though of limited importance today, it could assert itself in coming years. The Soviet Union had a powerless assembly but when the army tried to oust Gorbachev, politicians seized the moment and brought down a 74-year-old regime. Years of weakness followed.
The IRGC cannot at present abolish parliament. It’s part of government and must be respected. Parliament can, however, be used to the generals’ advantage by strengthening ties with hardliners and helping them, by hook or by crook, get into office and form an insurmountable and beholden majority. The process is well underway. Three IRGC figures (Hossein Dehghan, Parviz Fattah, and Saeed Mohammad) will be strong contenders for the presidency. Elections this spring might be telling.
The effort will be helped by tailwinds. Reformist politicians are saddled with economic failures over the last decade or more and diplomatic dealings with the US that brought only more sanctions and dangers.
The IRGC can coalesce military, industrial, and political institutions into a formidable power bloc that would make it the dominant force in Iran.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.