Spillover and escalation in the Ukraine war

Brian M Downing 

European wars used to spread. The Dutch revolt against Spain (1568-1648) was fought in the Low Countries, Caribbean, Mediterranean, South America, and Southeast Asia. Henry Adams noted a skirmish between Britain and France in the American backwoods led to the Seven Years War, which devastated the continent. Most wars since 1945 have fortunately been contained. Vietnam involved only Cambodia and Laos. The Iran-Iraq War of the eighties didn’t become a sectarian war across the Islamic world. Two Afghan wars entailed help from many foreign powers but fighting didn’t spread. The Balkan wars of the nineties didn’t involve neighboring empires or a fallen archduke.

This isn’t the case with the Russian-Ukraine War. Russia’s vast land mass, stated aggressive ambitions, and threat to the world order make for wider involvement. The war has already spilled over to other parts of the world as states see opportunity. How much fighting will follow?

Iran

US intelligence reports that Iran is training Russians to use their attack drones. Russia wants them badly. They would be highly useful in finding and destroying the HIMARS which have been devastating its supply depots, bridges, and command posts in recent weeks.

American missteps, especially rejecting Iran’s 2003 call for dialog, terminating the JCPOA, and assassinating an IRGC general, ended any chance for rapprochement and made Iran an implacable foe. Iran is now foursquare in its alignment with Russia and its more powerful Chinese ally. Iran sees them as ascending powers and wants to help them weaken the West, especially the US, and become an important part of the new order.  

Azerbaijan-Armenia

The two Caucasus countries, both former SSRs, have skirmished intermittently since the Soviet Union broke apart. The most recent fighting was eased with Russian pressure and peacekeepers. Sensing Russian overextension, Azerbaijan has renewed the fighting and seized territory across the truce line. Russian peacekeepers had to look on.

Turkey supported Azerbaijan in the past and probably encouraged the recent fighting. Ankara too senses Moscow’s vulnerability and wants to increase its power in the region.  

Belarus 

Russia initiated ground drives on Kyiv from Belarus and still uses it to launch air and missile strikes. Belarusians don’t support the war or their president, Alexander Lukashenko. He rigged an election two years ago and clung to power with Russian help. Since then, he has supported the war with bellicose rhetoric, threats of intervention, and weapon transfers to depleted Russian units.

Belarusian railroads, important for Russia’s logistics, have been damaged by explosions. Political dissidents have been put on trial but Belarusian security personnel who place nationalism above expediency are likely to have lent a hand. More recently a Russian airbase was struck by explosions.

Instability would alarm Moscow. A new government might expel Russian troops and in time lean west, economically and politically, much as Ukraine did in the last decade. Putin wouldn’t stand for it. He’d have to allocate tens of thousands of troops to keeping Lukashenko or someone like him in power. The Russian generals would of course see a quick operation but the occupation would be lengthy and costly.   

Kazakhstan 

Nursultan Nazarbayev, leader of the former SSR in Central Asia, like Lukashenko, called upon Putin when political troubles erupted late last year. More recently, however, he’s been dismayed if not alarmed by him. Putin has boldly stated that his invasion of Ukraine isn’t about defending against NATO, it’s about rebuilding empire. He wants to restore the power and territory of the Stalin era.  

Kazakhstan would be an attractive target. It’s over a million square miles and has considerable oil resources, including the Tengiz field – the world’s sixth largest. Exports go west to the Mediterranean and east to China. Army and state are weak. 

Kazakhstan has criticized Russian aggression and questioned continued participation in the Russian-centered Collective Security Treaty Organization. It’s stopped sending oil through Russian pipelines and is switching to Azerbaijan’s.

Part two: Israel and Syria, Chechnya, Eastern Europe, and Korea.  

©2022 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.