Brian M Downing
Containment II
An obvious response to Putin is to strengthen the system of alliances and bases that surrounded the old Soviet Union. George F Kennan called for containment in his 1947 Foreign Policy article. NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and the rearmament of Germany quickly followed. Kennan, however, came to believe that containment had been pursued too vigorously, reawakening the stalwart “endangered motherland” tradition in Russian culture, and perpetuating mistrust.
Containment has already been strengthened. In the 90s Eastern European states, fearful that Russia would be back on its feet and a danger once again, entered NATO. Their armies were built up, equipped with western arms, and integrated with long-standing NATO forces. Russians felt renewed danger from the West and rallied to nationalism, dictatorship, and bold efforts to regain power in the world. Eastern Europe and the West were alarmed and Containment II became all the firmer, but it’s not going to alter Russian behavior.
Economic leverage
Putin’s legitimacy rests on two pillars: restoring Russian power prestige and revitalizing the economy. Both had collapsed in the 90s. Weakening the economy will undermine Putin’s legitimacy, at least in the long run. An array of sanctions already press on Russia as a result of the Ukraine invasion. They are not especially stringent, and Putin points to what hardships they bring as part of a centuries-old effort to weaken the motherland.
Sanctions have a long history in foreign policy but they’ve only rarely brought their intended goals. S Africa, Iran, Venezuela, Iraq, and Cuba are cases in point. The US and its allies can better weaken Putin by hitting his oil and gas revenue.
Hydrocarbon supplies are increasing around the world. Motor vehicles are more fuel efficient and alternate energy sources are coming online. More importantly, world production has soared due to recent technologies (fracking and horizontal drilling) and new fields. The Eastern Mediterranean will be producing oil and gas in coming years. It’s close to the EU and producing nations like Greece, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Israel are less objectionable than Russia.
Germany is working against this. It’s seeking to moderate Russia’s behavior by increasing gas purchases from Putin. The strategy has an implicit threat. Continued foreign missteps and attacks on democracy could trigger a shift from Russian energy sources to the Mediterranean and N America.
Misuse of national wealth
The US, in public statements and broadcasts into Russia, can present concerted and candid messages that will weaken Putin in the long run. One message should be Putin’s questionable use of the tremendous wealth he controls, if not owns outright.
Putin’s personal wealth is considerable. He has seized assets and exacted control of his country’s mining and forestry industries. Intelligence agencies estimate his fortune at $200 billion. That puts him in the same league as Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates – figures who didn’t steal their wealth. Allegations of Putin’s ownership of a Romanov-like dacha in the recently annexed Crimea have riled him.
Russians do not expect their leaders to live monkish lives. They are willing to see Putin’s wealth as due someone who has done so much for the country, at least for now. However, if GDP were to slump from the programs outlined here, and average people feel hard times, they might be less understanding of the new tsar and his sybaritic palaces.
Russians may also come to see foreign ventures as wasteful. Seeing Russian jets over Middle Eastern skies stymying Western designs was thrilling. But building permanent bases in Libya, Syrian, and perhaps elsewhere may one day be seen as irresponsible drains on public monies that could be used for domestic problems. This sentiment undermined Qaddafi and other Middle Eastern strongmen. Putin must know that.
Resentment might develop in the high councils. Putin’s generals know too well how poorly-equipped and indifferently-trained much of the military is, especially in the trans-Ural region where China is expanding its influence. And that too is the result of misallocated spending.
Next: loss of prestige to China and concentration of power
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.