Brian M Downing
The US is walking away from the JCPOA and sectarian conflict is poised to spread, intensify, and probably go on for years. The US and Israel are foursquare on the Sunni side. Iran and Saudi Arabia have been at odds since Khomeini came to power in 1979 and Iraq invaded the Islamic Republic two years later. Proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. How will the conflict end, if it does?
There are several possible outcomes. Iran could emerge victorious, though the correlation of forces are not favorable. The conflict could go on for years with neither Riyadh nor Tehran emerging victorious, with each suffering critical internal disarray. The wars could entail terrorism throughout the region – and in Britain and the US. Alternately, Saudi Arabia could emerge victorious over Iran.
How Saudi Arabia can win
The powers aligned against Iran are unlikely to invade the country. That would be met with fierce resistance from the IRGC, regular army, and Basij militias. Invasion would bring support for the regime; its enemies want opposition to intensify.
Over the course of protracted conflict, Iran could suffer thousands of casualties and expend vast sums of money. This could reignite the anti-regime movement that arose unexpectedly last winter. Many people voiced opposition to the government’s wasteful campaigns in Syria and Yemen. Riyadh might have heard them better than Tehran did. Jerusalem almost certainly did.
Turmoil could be aggravated by insurgencies in northwestern and southeastern parts of the Islamic Republic. These of course will be encouraged by foreign powers.
The mullahs and generals might start to lose control, leading to a harsh crackdown and protracted disorder. Alternately, they might reluctantly cede power to a democratically-elected legislature. This could calm things but eventually bring factionalism, separatism, paralysis, and open conflict with traditionalist forces in the military and society.
The Kingdom
Should this scenario play out, Iran would be at least in disarray and at worst on the path of disintegration that Syria and Libya have gone down. Saudi Arabia would be master of the Gulf.
It would be a tremendous coup for Mohammed bin Salman, even if the US and Israel were mainly responsible for Iran’s defeat. His position on the throne would be solidified against discontented members of the royal family. Opposition in society, from democratic reformists to Islamist militants, would be more manageable.
Saudi Arabia would stand at the head of an impressive league of Sunni states, including the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and parts of Lebanon and Yemen. Iraq, Qatar, and Oman, which steer a neutral course between the two Gulf powers, would be Finlandized, so to speak. Mohammed bin Salman would have an empire of sorts.
Consequences
Saudi Arabia would be the region’s hegemon and Mohammed bin Salman would deem himself a latter-day Abu Bakr, Saladin, or Abdul Aziz. He may seek territorial acquisitions, suppression of Shi’ism, perhaps even a nuclear program. What great power, the young ruler might reason, doesn’t have nuclear weapons?
Mohammed bin Salman may reevaluate his partnership with Israel and the US. As crucial as those two states may have been to his ascendance, he will be eager to demonstrate that he’s no longer beholden to them and that he now leads a great nation and alliance system. He may feel a need to placate traditionalists inside his country and league by defending the Palestinians and al Aqsa.
It’s difficult to see cooperation among Saudi Arabia, the US, and Israel as enduring. The possibility of renewed hostility from a powerful Saudi Arabia must have occurred to Israeli strategists and to at least some American ones. They surely have responses – ones that the Saudi ruler anticipates but may not be able to counter.
For all its new power prestige, Saudi Arabia will depend on hydrocarbon revenue, even if Mohammed bin Salman’s industrialization program is well underway. World demand is flat and prices may be driven downward by production in North America and the eastern Mediterranean.
Lingering discontent inside the Kingdom can be exacerbated by narratives underscoring the king’s collaboration with the US and Israel – two countries whose “satanic” qualities persist in Saudi culture. The mantle of the warrior-king might be more awe-inspiring to king and retinue than to their subjects.
Saudi hegemony will foster resentments in the region. The Kingdom is already disliked for its Salafist propagation, political meddling, and haughty opulence. Various nationalist elements, marginalized Shia peoples, secular middle classes, and the ubiquitous, numerous, and disciplined Muslim Brotherhood will all oppose Saudi influence. Some will do so violently.
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Mohammed bin Salman’s achievement, should it come about, may be no more enduring than the empires ibn Khaldun studied six hundred years ago, each of which conquered vast territories but inevitably fell apart as local opposition built. Many Middle Eastern regions and at least two foreign powers will want ibn Khaldun’s pattern to carry on in our century.
© 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.