Brian M Downing
Over the last few months Iraq, like many countries in and out of the Middle East, has been hit hard by violent protests. The Baghdad government is paralyzed. Most of the violence was aimed at Iranian targets at the direction of Shia leader Moqtada al Sadr – and indirectly by the Saudi crown prince. Recently, other Shia groups attacked US positions, including the embassy, undoubtedly at the direction of the IRGC.
President Trump struck back by killing IRGC general Suleimani and the leader of a major Iraqi militia. Tehran’s response has not come yet, save for sporadic attacks by Iraqi militias. More will follow as the mood in Iran is like that of the US after the 9/11 attacks and Pearl Harbor. The consequences of the growing conflict for Iraq cannot be known for sure but they will be significant and perhaps ruinous.
Conventional war
Though the US has been deploying more and more ground troops into the region, including a few battalions of the 82nd Airborne, out and out warfare is highly unlikely. US troop levels are far too low for that and the generals would vehemently oppose it. They do not trust the White House and know the Iranian army would not fold, as did Saddam’s in 2003, and the IRGC has hundreds of thousands of ill-trained but spirited reservists.
Iran has no interest in reprising a war like the one in the 80s. It knows US conventional forces destroyed Saddam’s army in matter of days twice, whereas Iranian forces battled them for eight years and only managed a stalemate. Tehran also worries its economy might buckle amid a war and realizes Russia and China cannot project enough forces into the region to match up with what the US has based there routinely.
What about a conventional war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, say, after a complete US pullout from Iraq? Unlikely, though Riyadh might calculate that it can outspend Iran and bring its economy to collapse. The Saudis would never risk sending their army into what would almost certainly be a long costly effort. Iran has three times the population, more people under arms, and a measure of combat experience from operations in Syria.
Marginalization of pro-Iran forces
The US, Saudi Arabia, and Iraqi factions opposed to Iran (Shia and Sunni) may embark on an effort to quash Iranian influence. Their militias can be worn down and in time disarmed. Fighting is underway, though the intensity and duration are unknown.
Iranian influence in government could be reduced, even eliminated, by a shift from a frail democracy to a strong dictatorship. Many Iraqis are disenchanted with democracy and eagerly want Iranian influence choked off. Some, like Moqtada al Sadr, the scion of a distinguished line of clerics, prefer theocratic government – with him as the grand ayatollah of course. The Saudis fear democracy in their region and want it stamped out lest it inspire their subjects.
Non-alignment
Iraqis could well tire of turmoil which they see, quite accurately, as the result of American, Saudi, and Iranian interference. They might press their government to end the presence of all sides and steer a neutral course. The government has tried to steer that course, parlous as it is, but with considerable Iranian and American influence and military personnel. Baghdad tolerated IRGC officers inside their country, awarded US firms lucrative oil leases, and when ISIL seized the north, the call went to Washington, not Tehran.
Iraq could break with the US, Saudi Arabia, and Iran and align with Qatar and Oman. Those other two oil-rich states stay out of the sectarian and other conflicts in the Gulf and seek to limit Saudi power over the region.
The move would benefit Iraq and much of the Gulf. However, most Iraqis are passionately committed to one foreign power or another, at least for the time being. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and probably the US would do everything they could to prevent realignment with Qatar and Oman. A more thoughtful American policy would encourage a neutral bloc of oil-rich states opposed to Saudi hegemony.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.