Brian M Downing
US exit?
A few weeks ago angry protesters in Iraq called an end to Iranian interference. After Soleimani’s assassination, calls for ousting the US erupted. The sentiment is shared by many MPs and a legally-binding order is in the works. President Trump’s threat of sanctions hardly cooled things. He may have made the statement to speed the second ouster, but it might be just another example of dilettantism.
In 2008, late in Bush’s second term, the Iraqi government ordered the US out by the end of 2011. The Obama administration eagerly complied but soon enough Baghdad requested help against a resurgent AQ and ISIL’s 2014 offensive. If a second order comes it’s unlikely to provide a three-year time period. It might not include the expulsion of all US troops. Counter-terrorism and training missions might be allowed to keep the clamps on ISIL and AQ. However, national ire may call for a more complete expulsion and presidential ire may demand the same.
ISIL has lost its extensive territory but ensconced itself in western Iraq and eastern Syria. There are Sunni majorities in those regions that despise their Shia governments and that allows jihadis to maintain underground networks from which they strike.
Calls for keeping US personnel in Iraq until ISIL is completely eradicated are enduring, somewhat compelling, but naive. ISIL is based on an immense number of men under twenty-five, decades of Salafi/Wahabbi preaching, a multitude of unpopular governments, and the appeal of honor and glory in war. ISIL will persist for decades, perhaps generations, hence a US effort to eradicate it will persist just as long. It is bound to increase local resentments.
Iraq’s military elite
The US’s most striking success in Iraq was the construction of elite army units that systematically defeated ISIL in Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, and finally Mosul. Green Berets trained the forces, saw that professional officers replaced regime favorites, and instilled a fighting spirit rarely seen in Middle Eastern armies. The elite formations relied on American advisors, artillery, medical, and logistical personnel that operated behind them. Without them, elite performance will suffer significantly.
Elite units will play a role in Iraq’s future. If the country continues to unravel from militia fighting, separatist Sunnis and Kurds, and power grabs by militias and tribal leaders, the Iraqi state may near collapse. The government in Baghdad may have to call upon elite units to impose order and keep it in power.
Alternately, elite commanders may see it their duty to impose order themselves, regardless of Baghdad’s directives, perhaps against its directives. Elite units have been the principal engines of coups since decolonization began after WW2.
Where then will be the American advisors and trainers who continue to serve with elite units? What will their role be? What might the White House have in store for them – deeper involvement or tickets home?
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.