NATO weaknesses and Russian opportunities
Brian M Downing
Vladimir Putin sees the weaknesses in NATO. Defense budgets are flagging, commitment to new members in Eastern Europe is dubious. In 1939, France asked, “Die for Danzig?” Today, much of NATO is unlikely to go to war over Eastern Europe or Turkey. The Russian president recognizes this and is positioned to act.
Putin will not simply invade Eastern Europe or engineer the heavy-handed coups that his forebear Joseph Stalin did. Such forcefulness would breathe resolve into NATO and open the door to a long conflict. He has opportunities to underscore NATO’s weaknesses without resorting to the blunt methods of his predecessor. In so doing, he can gravely damage NATO and achieve an impressive foreign policy success.
Turkey
The present conflict between Russia and Turkey is a continuation of enmity that goes back many centuries. The conflict today centers on the Syrian war, but in Russian strategy it bears on NATO and Turkey’s membership in it.
The 2014 seizure of the Crimea gave Russia a naval base and airfields close to Turkey (400 miles from Ankara) and the entire Middle East. The following year Russia built an airbase in northwestern Syria and installed its most sophisticated air defense system there. Russian radar and anti-aircraft missiles can now reach far into Turkey, making another shootdown of a Russian jet far riskier for Turkey. Russia recently deployed MiG-29 fighters to the Erebuni airfield in Armenia, just east of Turkey.
Perhaps most importantly, Russia is positioning itself as champion of Kurdish autonomy, in both Syria and Turkey. (Naturally, Russia is mute on the matter of autonomy for the Kurds of Iran, a Russian ally.) Moscow is seeking to get Syrian Kurds representation in peace talks and has scolded Turkey for a “fruitless” war on its Kurdish population.
This naturally raises the possibility of support for the PKK, the Kurdish organization battling for autonomy from Turkey. This could be more than diplomatic support and include weapons and training for PKK fighters, clandestinely or openly. This would weaken a NATO partner, though in a manner unlikely to trigger a military response from the alliance. A Kurdish insurgency would fall short of a foreign attack – the criterion for a NATO military response.
Turkey is not well liked in the West. Its government is Islamist and increasingly authoritarian. It is oppressing the Kurds who are admired in much of the world for their fierce battles with ISIL. Indeed, the Kurds are the only determined indigenous troops in the ISIL War. It would be fair to say that the Kurds are more popular than the Turks.
NATO support for Turkey against the Kurds, however tentative, would place the alliance on the side of Islamist authoritarianism and in opposition to an admired people. The Kurds’ claim for self-determination is convincing to most westerners, and they seem poised to become an important force in the volatile Middle East. (Israel may support Russia in this, as it too wants a strong Kurdish state to balance against Iran and other potential threats.)
Turkey of course would be livid at NATO inaction, especially that of the US which has used Turkish bases, from the Cold War to the present ISIL War.
The Ukraine
Though not a NATO partner, the Ukraine is backed by the alliance and wants to become a member. Russia’s campaign to dismember the Ukraine and secure a land bridge from to the Crimea is on hold. It may pick up in coming months.
It’s well known, though not admitted in Moscow, that there are Russian troops in the eastern Ukraine. Less well know are the 1200 Russian troops just to the west of the Ukraine in Transdniestria, a breakaway part of Moldavia. Russia also has bases and troops to the north in Belarus, a former Soviet republic closely tied to Russia. Putin has boasted that Russian armor could near Kiev in a matter of days.
Though more respected in the West than is Turkey, the Ukraine is widely seen as deeply corrupt and politically chaotic. Its army, though improving as the war proceeds, is far from professional. Neo-fascist militias serve alongside regular army units. Despite outnumbering Russian and pro-Russian forces, Ukrainian forces appear to western publics as a longterm liability rather than an able partner.
Latvia
Like the Ukraine, the Baltic states were once Soviet republics. They are all fearful of resurgent Russian nationalism and they are all relatively isolated from the West. The Baltic states have a narrow common border with Poland, but just northwest is the Russian exclave 
of Kaliningrad – home to a large contingent of Russian troops, aircraft, and warships.
Latvia is especially vulnerable. About 25% of the population is ethnic Russian and it is concentrated in the east near the Russian border and in the port city of Riga. Russian special forces claiming to be indigenous militias defending against neo-fascist elements might reprise their Crimean campaign.
Like the other Baltic states of Lithuania and Estonia, Latvia is a NATO member. An attack on it would, according to treaty, call for a response. However, the use of disguised Russian troops, accompanied by Moscow’s denial of any presence, will provide an excuse for NATO members to avoid involvement.
Objectives
Putin cannot be so heady as to think he can restore the old Soviet empire. He could not hope to suppress and govern the populations of Eastern Europe as his forebears did. Actions against Turkey, the Ukraine, and Latvia will serve more modest goals.
First, a serious rift would develop between Turkey and NATO, possibly leading to greater Russian influence in various Kurdish lands and in Iraq.
Second, Russia can make clear to the world that NATO does not have the will to defend all its members. Eastern Europe and Turkey will realize that they cannot rely on NATO and must provide for their own defense, if possible.
Third, Russia could force the Ukraine to cede the Eastern Ukraine, including a land bridge from Russia to the recently annexed Crimea, with its naval and air assets.
Fourth, the Ukraine and the Baltic states may be pressed to withdraw from NATO in exchange for Russian guarantees of respecting their sovereignty – minus the eastern portions of Latvia and the Ukraine. And of course a guarantee from Vladimir Putin is of dubious value.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.