Brian M Downing
The policy of Russia is changeless. Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy, world domination, is a fixed star.
– Karl Marx
The war on Ukraine didn’t stem from NATO expansion. It was the result of Putin’s fixation on restoring lost empire and winning legitimacy. Military expansion has been deeply ingrained for centuries in tsars and premiers, nobles and commissars, serfs and workers. After all, the world’s largest country was once a small principality under Mongol rule.
Muscovite princes resented paying tribute and raised a levy under Dmitri Donskoi to face the Mongols at Kulikova (1380). Dmitri carried the day and the khans’ grasp slipped away. The region still foreboding, princes seized adjacent land and controlled more crops, fur-bearing animals, and minerals. A larger army and expanding control brought Muscovy into conflict with Lithuanians, the Teutonic Knights, Tatar bands, and eventually the Ottomans. Armies clashed, boundaries changed – mostly in Moscow’s favor.
The going was easier to the east. Tatar bands weren’t united and the Mughals were in decline. Tsarist armies crossed the steppes and Urals and brought more land under their rule. Reaching the frontiers of China, they forced treaties on frail emperors, annexed territory, and reached the Pacific.
The Russian state was dedicated to conquest and exploitation. The aristocracy, eager for more holdings, power, and honor, was essential to the enterprise. The Orthodox Church – as much a part of the sate as the army – was charged with sanctifying the deeds of tsars, nobles, and generals and justifying the unfortunate lots of everyone else. Serfs were enthralled by military-religious myths of conquest, glory, and servitude or cowed by the knout. Victory fused the crown, nobility, and serfs together. Defeat weakened ties and required reforms, but most were of limited scope and short duration.
Failure in World War One brought the state down. Strictly speaking, the Bolsheviks took control of it. They ceded land to Germany but took it back when the Reichswehr disintegrated the following year. An effort to retake Poland met with defeat, at least for a while. Seeing capitalist nations eager to destroy Bolshevik Russia, Lenin and Stalin sought to take over new Eastern European states and use the Comintern to weaken capitalism and prepare the way for communist rule. Russian expansionism took on a new ideological aura.
The Second World War brought opportunity to revert to traditional expansion. The Red Army crushed the Wehrmacht and took Eastern Europe and a swathe of Germany, including the old Prussian demesne. Stalin expressed disappointment at not entering Paris, as did Tsar Alexander I after the Napoleonic Wars. Victory gave Soviet communism legitimacy it could never have achieved through politics and economics.
The Soviet empire collapsed in 1991. Eastern Europe and Central Asia broke away. This presented no security threat. NATO had no interest in driving east and never did. This was clear in Brussels and in Moscow too. Eastern European countries knew a resurgence of Russian nationalism was inevitable and sought entry into the defense pact.
Laid low by losing the Cold War and the dissolution of their government, Russians were swept by pessimism, malaise, and senses of lost times. History and traditions were derided. Many young people looked to Western culture. Political and military elites wanted to reassert national power. Putin orchestrated the nationalist resurgence with martial parades and commemorations of the Great Patriotic War. Orthodox priests, in full regalia, gave benediction as in the old days. Communism was gone, Orthodoxy was back.
Putin had more in mind than recreations of past glories. The dress rehearsals reminded Russians of proud wars in the past and prepared them for coming ones. The campaign began with restive regions in the Caucasus and vulnerable parts of the former empire, including Georgia, Transnistria. and parts of Ukraine. Russian forces are building bases and acquiring business operations in North Africa and the Middle East. But of course Ukraine is the centerpiece. Retaking the former SSR will be a big step in weakening the West and restoring Russian greatness. There are more steps in mind.
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Expansionism has long been central to the Russian identity. It’s ingrained in institutions, official history, public monuments, family lore, and sermons. There’s essential continuity from Dmitri Donskoi and Peter the Great to Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Putin. Defeats after the Crimean and Russo-Japanese wars led to discontent and reforms but later rulers were able to rekindle martial ardor.
Putin may face defeat in Ukraine in a year or two and domestic discontent may become problematic. However, enduring political reforms and acceptance of post-Soviet borders aren’t likely. He or a successor will be able to restore martial ardor and revanchist expansion.
©2024 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.