Russia suffers defeat in eastern Syria

Brian M Downing

Vladimir Putin has had a bad week. His vaunted air defense system in Syria brought down an Israeli F-16, but the IDF responded with retaliatory strikes that crippled the system, destroying perhaps one-third of it. Beyond the military significance of this, Russian military hardware isn’t looking attractive on world arms markets – and arms exports are important to the Russian economy.

This Tuesday it was reported that Russian mercenary troops were involved in a sharp engagement near Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria where they took very high casualties. Russian social media are abuzz with talk of the losses. The docile Moscow duma is asking questions.

The Russian campaign in the east has been blunted, leaving the region, for now, in the hands of US-backed Kurdish-Arab troops known as the Syrian Democratic Forces. What does the Russian defeat hold for Syria and for the designs on the region held by the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel?

The region

The barren expanses of eastern Syria are important economically and geopolitically. Syria isn’t blessed with the oil reserves of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, but what oil it has lies beneath the soil near Deir ez-Zor . The revenue will be helpful in rebuilding Syria. Without it, Moscow and Tehran will foot the bill. Neither is flush with cash and the undertaking would be burdensome and protracted.

The region is situated between two Shia capitals, Damascus and Tehran. A land route stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean is highly desirable to Shia countries and to Hisbollah as well. Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US want very much to prevent a Shia Corridor, or at least to be positioned to close it off someday. The oil fields near Deir ez-Zor could help support the Sunni cause in eastern Syria, perhaps with a Sunni statelet there.

The engagement

The Russian troops massed near Deir ez-Zor and drove east – without air cover and on open terrain. The folly was compounded. US-backed troops were in defensive positions and had American airpower on call. The result was a rout – and a costly one for the Russian side. Losses on the US side were light.

Why were Russian mercenaries involved in the action? The distinction between Russian army troops and private contractors has been vague if not meaningless since the invasions of the Crimea and the eastern Ukraine. Denial has only slight plausibility here.

Mercenaries may have been used because the Syrian army and allied militias are worn down and otherwise engaged in holding territory in the west and trying to retake Idlib in the north. Syrian troops must be watchful of continued Turkish actions along the border. The dearth of Syrian and allied troops may have led Damascus and Iran to press Moscow hard on the matter, and perhaps Putin, ever eager to display national might, may have acceded.

The response

Putin’s domestic support rests on economic prosperity and restoration of power prestige, both of which had sunk low before he took the helm. Prosperity is based mainly on oil revenue which has come off deep lows but will likely remain sluggish for years.

Power prestige too is susceptible to steep falls, especially after military blunders. That’s what brought down the Hohenzollerns, Habsburgs, and Romanovs in 1918. Putin is as aware of this as anyone and he may strike back in the Middle East. Options in eastern Syria are unattractive though. He could relaunch a drive with air support and more ground troops.

But that might not change the military equation. US-backed troops enjoy the advantages of defensive positions. Russian jets will not be able to bomb with impunity as they did at Aleppo and elsewhere. They will face American-supplied Stinger missiles and perhaps American fighter aircraft based in the region. The competitiveness of Russian military hardware is in doubt after what the Israeli air force did last week – mainly with American equipment.

A campaign in the east, if protracted, would require Syrian and allied troops to redeploy from the west. This would leave the Turkish border more vulnerable, put the Idlib campaign on hold, and provide rebel forces with opportunities. Israel, adamantly opposed to a Shia Corridor, would intensify actions in the west, hammering pro-Assad assets. Syrian air defenses are of dubious usefulness now.

A judicious ruler in the Kremlin will forego a rush for retaliation and question eastern Syria’s significance to Russian security. A long campaign there will be expensive. Even if successful, it will bring hostility and countermeasures from the Sunni powers and Israel. Putin charged into Syria in 2015 but is becoming bogged down. Rather than escalate in the east, he may choose to play down the Deir ez-Zor defeat and continue consolidation in western Syria.

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.

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