Brian M Downing
In 1943, two years after invading the Soviet Union, the Third Reich lost the initiative after a defeat at Kursk. Today, Russia’s lost the initiative, paradoxically not far south of Kursk. The effort to take Kyiv ended in hasty retreat and the Donbas campaign has failed too. Three months into the war, Russian units are depleted, dispirited, and on the defensive.
Ukraine has interior lines of communication, better tactical capacities, superior weaponry, local support, and peerless fighting spirit. It also has at least two options. Kyiv can launch offensives in coming weeks to quickly and decisively defeat the enemy. Alternately, it can hold off and wear down the enemy for weeks or months, pushing it into collapse. Subsequent Ukrainian offensives would be much less costly.
Offensive in the east and south
Concentrated attacks on parts of the northern and southern flanks of the Donbas pocket could open gaps in Russian lines. Ukrainian armor could then drive deep behind them – blitzkrieg on the steppes. Supplies to Russian units will be tenuous. Generals will be in disarray as they scurry to salvage a rapidly deteriorating situation. Many BTGs will scramble for the border or risk annihilation.
Ukraine could strike along the Russian land bridge in the south. Attacks may come before those in the east, concurrent with them, or instead of them. Two axes of advance seem likely. One would push south from Zaporozhzhia on the Dnipro River toward the Black Sea. The second would move east along the coast from Kherson. Both would strike for Melitopol. The offensive would benefit from strong partisan operations in occupied areas west of Melitopol.
Russia’s vaunted land bridge would be broken. Crimea would be isolated and vulnerable, especially if Ukrainian drones and cruise missiles continue to strike Russian ships. The generals would be fearful of losing the historic and vital peninsula which they seized in 2014. Russian command of the Black Sea would be endangered, as would operations in Syria and Libya.
Attrition
Offensives in the east and/or south offer the prospect of quickly defeating Russian forces and sending them packing. However, the attacks might be costly and Ukrainian casualties have already been high. Russian troops, though not high quality, have learned a thing or two in recent months and could prove more effective in defensive positions than on the offensive.
Ukraine might do well to hold off from offensive operations and concentrate on attritting Russian forces along the Donbas pocket and Black Sea. New artillery and counter-battery systems will greatly reduce Russian artillery, which has been taking a toll on Ukrainian troops. Then artillery, drones, Switchblades, antitank weapons, and various other weapons can systematically and relentlessly pound Russian positions, supply convoys, and command posts – Verdun on the steppes.
Russian casualties will be unstoppable, the ability to strike back limited, the strain on exhausted veterans and uneasy newbies considerable. More BTGs will become ineffective, more soldiers will become insubordinate. Animosity and mistrust will pervade the chain of command from forward headquarters to the high councils in Moscow.
Many BTGs could become disaggregated, leaderless, armed bands foraging for food and avoiding contact with the enemy and their own commanders as well. Positions inside Ukraine could be untenable. Efforts to flee back to Russia will be slowed by summary executions and fuel shortages. Each month of stalemate and casualties will bring further rancor, paranoia, and intrigue in the state and greater unease in the public.
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Offensives in the east and south have the appeal of quick victory. However, they may cause high Ukrainian casualties and allow many Russian units to reach safety more or less intact. Ukraine can more easily retake territory by grinding down Russian units for several months across long fronts.
The ground-down Russian army won’t be able to reconstitute itself for many years. The political system will be in disarray. Ukraine will have more time to reconstitute its forces, rebuild its cities, and with western support, become a regional superpower – one that Russian generals will be loath to attack, regardless of miscalculating politicians.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.