Russia departed unceremoniously from Afghanistan in 1988. The US left a few years later, with more dignity, on the winning side, but exasperated by postwar infighting. Islamist terrorism brought the US back hurriedly in 2001. The spread of Islamist militancy is leading to greater Russian interest.
Russia has recently parleyed with Afghan warlords, chiefly those from the old Northern Alliance, many of whom are worried about Kabul’s failures and the Taliban’s successes. Russia, it is often forgotten, supported northerners in the long war against the Taliban, and has been training security forces for over a decade now.
More remarkably, Russia announced last week that its interests in Afghanistan “objectively coincide” with those of the Taliban – fierce opposition to ISIL. What’s afoot?
The Afghan stalemate and Central Asia
Following the departure of western ground troops, the Taliban expanded their control in the south and more recently in limited parts of the north. Afghan government troops are performing reasonably well, though they are weary and stretched thin. American airpower and limited use of special forces help maintain a stalemate.
The sight of the US bogged down in Afghanistan must be pleasant in Moscow. After all, the US did everything it could to bleed the Red Army there in the eighties. However, the war is attracting more and more foreign jihadis, and ISIL is establishing itself in pockets of Afghanistan. Islamist militancy may spread into Central Asia, including former Soviet republics, which Moscow considers in its sphere of influence.
Russia’s design
By publicly announcing common interests with the Taliban, Russia is seeking a dialog leading to concerted action. An ‘in” with the Taliban will position Russia to broker negotiations between the Taliban and Kabul. This is not in the offing, but what sort of arrangement might Russia be seeking?
The Taliban conquered large parts of the south despite the presence of tens of thousands of western ground troops. There is no prospect at all of retaking these Taliban lands. Russia may be able to convince the Taliban, or at least its main faction, to accept autonomy in those lands and abide with a ceasefire. The Taliban will abandon international ambitions and eliminate the ISIL presence, which threatens Russia, other countries in the region, and the Taliban as well.
Russia can provide incentives to all sides. The Taliban will receive money for reconstruction, as long as a rough ceasefire holds. The Kabul government and northern warlords will also receive payments from Russia – perhaps bolstered by regional powers and western ones too.
Russia is not reentering the great game alone. It will find, if it has not already arranged, solid support from neighboring Iran, which has long had influence with northern peoples, and from China, which controls much of Afghanistan’s mineralogical wealth (oil, iron, copper, and rare earths). Both fear Islamist militancy – Iran on its eastern and western borders, China in its western region.
All three powers would love to reduce American influence in their backyards. Add a third – Pakistan to the south – and the powers have greater influence with the Taliban and another export route.
The US
Russia, China, and Iran may one day agree on ousting the US from Afghanistan, or at least minimizing its influence there, setting the stage for their ambitions in developing and controlling Central Asia. Many Russian policy makers will relish the sight of the US departing unceremoniously from Afghanistan. There must be a Russian word for schadenfreude.
The US will naturally feel uncomfortable about Russia’s lead in a settlement and in its pragmatic deal with the Taliban. The sentiment will be all the more uncomfortable as Russia is taking the lead in preliminary Syrian talks as well. Many realist analysts might see such a settlement as allowing a relatively graceful way out of an endless commitment in a landlocked country far away.
©2015 Brian M Downing