Brian M Downing
The Ukraine war has taken a new turn. Russia blunted Ukraine’s summer offensive and made slight advances in the center. It has now shifted to the north and begun driving on Kharkiv. Advances have been significant. Russia came close to taking the city at the opening of the war but was driven out in the fall. The retreat was disorderly and costly. What’s this new campaign trying to accomplish and what are its chances for success?
Objectives
The army is driving south from Russian territory. The buildup was relatively safe as US-made weapons such as ATACMS couldn’t be used. The generals feel confident in their numbers, weaponry, and willpower and may think they can take Kharkiv. It’s Ukraine’s second largest city and would be a sign of progress, perhaps comparable to taking Warsaw or Budapest in Stalin’s day. Failing that, they hope to get within artillery range. Then, in conjunction with missiles and drones, they will reduce the great city to rubble – Mariupol and Bakhmut on a larger scale.
Second, the generals want to draw Ukrainian forces away from the Donbas and fight the war in an area closer to Russian industrial and logistical centers. There will be less fighting at the end of long circuitous supply routes as in Donetsk and the approaches to Crimea.
Third, the campaign may lead to a decisive breakthrough, either around Kharkiv or elsewhere as Ukraine has to shift troops to defend a prestigious city. Mobile warfare may replace the trench lines – another sign of progress in Moscow.
Fourth, heavy losses, devastation of Kharkiv, and breakthrough may undermine Ukrainian national will. Losses may be immense and demoralizing – on the army and public too. This will lead to flagging morale in the army, widespread draft evasion and flight, calls for negotiations in Kyiv, and weakening support in the West.
Assessment
Taking Kharkiv will be difficult. Entering the city would bring fierce urban fighting that would grind down a dozen or more BTGs and drag on indefinitely. Mariupol, a much smaller city, took months to take and put several elite brigades out of action. The grim prospect of leveling the city is possible.
Attrition is of course a two-way street. Imperial Germany may have launched the Verdun campaign of 1916 in order to break the French army, but Germany suffered more casualties and French will persisted. Russia may feel its larger population gives a decided advantage but the army’s poor training and crude infantry tactics bring staggering casualties. The Ukrainians have interior lines of communication which facilitate movements of troops and supplies. More importantly, they’re fighting from defensive positions, often against large-scale infantry attacks. Even Russian mil-bloggers describe corpse-strewn fields.
Should a breakthrough occur, the Russian army probably couldn’t exploit it, at least not in the manner mapped out by Guderian. Russian commanders have repeatedly shown their inability to use armor effectively at even battalion-level operations. The blitzkriegs of World War Two and Desert Storm are beyond the capabilities of Kremlin appointees.
Russian hopes are high in both army and public. They’ve blunted the Ukrainian summer offensive and massed troops for a new campaign. This, paradoxically, could present problems if the campaign doesn’t succeed. Soldiers and civilians will endure hardships, casualties, lies, and incompetence but they must see signs of progress.
Two years into the Great Patriotic War, which Putin invokes at every opportunity to guide his public, the enemy had been repelled from the outskirts of Moscow, annihilated at Stalingrad, and turned back with heavy losses at Kursk. Putin’s war is in its third year and as much as Russia boasts of its flags hoisted above towns and villages, the successes don’t compare to those of 1941-42. They look more like the failures of 1917-1918. Unless Putin’s offensive meets with appreciable success, this may dawn on soldiers across frontlines and family members back home.
©2024 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.