Brian M Downing
Tides turn in wars. Germans know that well. Russians should. Russia began the Ukraine war with seemingly unstoppable drives from north, south, and east. Ukraine pushed them Russia back from Kyiv and Kharkiv. Russia began its eastern offensive and pushed into Luhansk. A decisive breakthrough loomed but the effort took only a few medium-sized towns.
Russia’s offensive punch is gone, perhaps not forever but ground attacks are presently insignificant. The army is hampered by high casualties and uncertain supplies. Tens of thousands of Russian troops west of the Dnipro are cut off and face destruction in coming weeks. They know it.
Fall is at hand. The advantages and confidences that the Russians had are now greatly weakened. The problems that plagued them after defeats in the spring are back. If stalemate and casualties persist, the army will be in trouble.
Combat units
The view here is that early on, owing to heterogeneity, poor training, harsh institutional culture, and inept junior officers, Russian combat units had poor cohesion and effectiveness. It showed on the approaches to Kyiv. The view was updated as hard experience instilled a measure of cohesion and effectiveness, though probably not in all units.
A third phase has begun. Cohesion and effectiveness have suffered from high casualties, paltry gains, deteriorating logistics, and unrelenting resistance including surging partisan attacks. Trust and confidence surged in the late spring but slumped as summer ended. The army is once again stalled and spiritless. Soldiers know they’ve lost the initiative. They’re no longer giving more than they take and must passively endure daily attrition from an enemy with increasingly sophisticated weapons which they cannot match.
Officer corps
Victory instills confidence and pride up and down the chain of command. Protracted stalemate weakens them. Defeat of course is disastrous.
Enlisted soldiers doubt the professional capabilities of local officers. Discipline and morale suffer. Local officers question the same things in higher-ups. Orders are not followed crisply. Demurrals and delays crop up, often at inopportune times.
The Russian army has been organized, equipped, and trained by a handful of senior officers, appointed by Putin over the last twenty years. The intention was to build a powerful army akin to the one Stalin conquered an empire with. Instead, they promoted loyalists, faked training reports, and lined their pockets.
Mid-level officers want to serve in a professional army to defend the nation but have to survive in a Potemkin army at war. They’ve seen equipment fail, commanders blunder, and young soldiers die by the thousands. Now they must deal with micromanagement from a mid-level KGB tough.
Enmity is emerging between professional officers and the political-military elite directing a war that was poorly-planned from the start and is now unwinnable. Change must come to avoid ruin. Winter is coming.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.