Revisiting the end of World War Two, again

Revisiting the end of World War Two, again

Brian M Downing 

Later this year President Obama will visit Hiroshima – the southern Honshu city that was destroyed by an atomic bomb at the end of World War Two. The White House insists that no apology will be made, but the announcement will bring back old debates about the necessity of using the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and three days later on Nagasaki.

In the US the issue has been reshaped by changing attitudes toward the military and the use of force, especially the use of nuclear weapons. In Japan the issue has been reshaped by the horror of the destruction of two of its cities but also by that country’s lingering sense of victimization during the war – a view not shared by its Asian neighbors and unwilling members in its Co-prosperity Sphere.

Japan on the verge of surrender?

By the summer of 1945, Japan’s chief ally, German, lay in ruins, most of the territory Japan carved out early in the war had been lost and the US and its allies were closing in on the mainland. Japan must have been ready to negotiate a peace agreement, if not surrender.

It wasn’t.

The Japanese constitution, respected by statesmen and soldiers alike, placed key decisions in the hands of a high council, and mandated unanimity. In such political arrangements elites recognize the need for effective decision-making and consensus is usually hammered out. It wasn’t. The Japanese high council, despite years of defeat, was deadlocked. Civilians and admirals on the council favored negotiations but the generals, insular and fanatical and apocalyptic, adamantly opposed them.

Some generals thought the impending invasion could be repelled and the nation could go on to win the war. Others thought the invasion would be so costly to the allies that Japan could negotiate a dignified settlement. Still others thought the Japanese people should all perish in a final testament to emperor and nation. Unanimous support for negotiations being impossible, the policy of continuing the war remained in place.

A related argument is that Japan was sending out peace feelers. Indeed, the navy sent an emissary to the OSS station chief in Switzerland. But when the emissary (Allen Dulles) was asked for evidence he spoke for the high council, the admirals, fearing assassination by the generals, backed off. Another feeler was sent to Stalin who opted not to relay it to Washington. Furthermore, in the same communication Japan was feeling out Stalin for an alliance against the US and Britain.

Not even the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki swayed the generals on the high council. Upon studying reports from the cities, they concluded that further casualties could be reduced by wearing long trousers and shirts. The war went on. More atomic bombs in coming months, more conventional bombings in coming days, growing starvation, and continued fighting in Asia. It was the emperor’s intervention, which was outside the constitution, that brought surrender.

Unrealistic casualty estimates?

The use of atomic bombs is said to have been based on shockingly and utterly unrealistic casualty estimates for the invasion of Japan. Wartime estimates naturally vary, and it’s unclear which ones were most highly credited, but allied casualties (killed and wounded) were expected to be shockingly high in the battles for the key islands of Kyushu and Honshu.

A few months earlier the US and Japan fought a savage battle for the island of Okinawa – a relatively small island defended by 120,000 Japanese troops and local conscripts. Over 110,000 of them were killed, along with 12,500 US troops. Estimates of civilian casualties range considerably as many were trapped in caves or leapt into the sea. Okinawan authorities put civilian deaths at 100,000. Total deaths on Okinawa were about the same as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Kyushu, the first mainland island to be invaded, was defended by 900,000 Japanese troops, not all of whom were well equipped but all of whom were determined to put up fierce resistance. Civilians were issued grenades, knives, and spears and instructed to kill as many invaders as possible for emperor and nation. If one-third of the Japanese troops were killed, the deaths would exceed those of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And after Kyushu would come the larger and better defended island of Honshu with the capital, Tokyo.

* * *

It’s often said that the US would never have dropped atomic bombs on Germany, only on non-white people. Untrue. The physicists and officers of the Manhattan Project labored to finish off the Third Reich. Had the Normandy invasion failed, and the Eastern Front stabilized inside Russia, Col Tibbets and the Enola Gay would have lifted off from a base in England and incinerated Berlin – with luck, including Hitler and the Nazi hierarchy. We would hear no complaints of racism or unnecessary casualties, not even in Germany.

Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.