Brian M Downing
No sooner had Assad’s plane left Syrian airspace when talk of regime change in Iran intensified. The notion has been around for decades. It’s embedded in political parties, think tanks, media, and lobbies. Advocates find steady work. They read each other’s reports and attend each other’s conferences. This leads to insular certainty. The mullahs are like Assad and Qaddafi and Ceausescu. They have little popular support. A little push and they’re gone.
Defeat in World War One brought down autocracies in Russia, Germany, and Austro-Hungary. The Argentine junta collapsed after Britain retook the Falklands. The Iranian regime has legitimized its rule not only by instituting Islamic law but also by defending the nation – from Saddam in the 80s and the US and Israel today. Damage to Hamas, Hisbollah, and Syria and the loss of thousands of Iranian soldiers have undermined the regime. So say politicians, think tanks, media, and lobbies. Now they want to deliver the little push.
But has the Syrian debacle weakened Tehran’s repressive capacity, caused deep divisions in the state, or led to serious armed opposition? Are the mullahs vulnerable?
Repressive capacity
Assad, Qaddafi, and Ceausescu saw their security forces disintegrate. What of the mullahs’ enforcers? Iran suffered thousands of casualties in Syria. Thousands more are stranded there. Precise numbers are unknown as the public was never informed of the deployments let alone the cost. But the large number of funerals couldn’t have gone unnoticed and rumors spread in marketplaces.
The losses are unlikely to significantly reduce repressive capacity. The IRGC has about 150,000 ground troops and 90,000 Basij paramilitary fighters. They are fiercely loyal to religious and military leaders. Ardor has probably increased as the country is more beleaguered now than at anytime since the Iraq war. Paramilitary fighters are recruited from the urban working class who look upon demonstrators as privileged, treasonous youths. Basij enforcers have demonstrated their zeal for delivering harsh justice many times over years.
Divisions in state
Imperiled governments are often rent by internal conflicts. Factions blame each other, argue over courses of action, fire and promote generals, and ponder needed reforms. There’s no evidence of serious divisions in Tehran but clerics and generals keep the curtains drawn tight. Parliament could assert itself as a power center by protesting the debacle in the Levant. However, their voices are quiet.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 85 and in failing health, occasionally disappearing from the public eye for extended periods. A new leader will be named in the near future and the transition may well seem smooth. However, the successor will lack the aura of standing with Khomeini during the revolution or guiding the nation through the Iraq war. IRGC generals may see opportunity to take the upper hand. The state will be less a theocracy with a loyal corps for protection and more a junta with a dutiful clergy for benediction. Repressive capacity will remain strong. The generals might be more eager than the mullahs to treat harshly with internal enemies.
The opposition
Demonstrations against rigged elections, austere Islamic rules, and deadly repression have been underway for decades. Women shun laws on veils at times and daring youths knock turbans off clerics’ heads. Discontent is widespread but it remains low level – and largely unarmed. The state believes that opposition at this level presents no danger. It can be extinguished easily whenever authorities give the signal.
A more serious danger stems from terrorism. The MeK has been at work since the days of the shah. It’s come to work hand in glove with Mossad, chiefly in assassinating figures in the nuclear program. It’s presently based in Albania with American support. The view here has been that despair over the dismal prospects of political change and brutal crackdowns would bring widespread terrorism. It hasn’t happened yet.
The most formidable opposition is the three main separatist groups: the Kurds in the northwest, Arabs in the west, and Balochs in the southeast. All are armed and supported by Israel and Sunni states. It remains to be seen if the groups will pick up the pace, on their own or at the urging of foreign backers. Separatists can assess the regime’s ability to fight back, and may choose to hold back.
There’s no sign now that demonstrators, terrorists, and separatists are intensifying their activities after the Syrian debacle. Nor is there evidence of cooperation, though of course that would be under wraps.
Coming airstrikes?
Israel, the US, Britain, and perhaps the Saudis have long formulated plans to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, especially uranium-enrichment sites at Natanz and Fordo. A particularly effective burrowing weapon (GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator) was developed for such sites and can only be delivered by American bombers. Israel has destroyed Syrian air defenses, clearing its path. Attacks may come with the new administration in Washington.
Advocates believe the strikes will encourage various oppositional groups to rise up and topple the mullahs. A little push and they’re gone. Reading the same reports and attending the same conferences may prevent appreciation of the regime’s repressive capacity and the extent of its popular support.
©2024 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.