Brian M Downing
War is bringing turmoil and instability to Russia. Putin faces trouble from westernized youth, religious and ethnic minorities, army reformers, and unruly Mobiks. The opposition is unlikely to topple the state but it could bring low-level violence that will distract attention and divert resources amid a failing war.
Putin, according to western intelligence, thwarted a coup last spring. His generals, intelligence chiefs, and security forces remain loyal, as best we can tell. However, security details can fail, a few rebel battalions could wreak havoc in Moscow, and Putin could simply become too impaired to govern. Whither Russia then?
Succession
The end of a powerful leader’s rule rarely leads to a smooth transition in Russia. Ivan IV left no competent offspring and Russia was wracked by aristocratic intrigue and foreign intervention – the Time of Troubles. Peter the Great’s death was followed by assassinations and insignificant successors.
Stalin’s death led to a power struggle and eventually Khrushchev’s ascendance. But he was toppled eight years later by a triumvirate that Brezhnev soon dominated. His death brought two short-lived nullities, an ambitious but clumsy reformer, and a clumsier military coup. It failed and the Soviet Union fell apart.
Succession will be more chaotic after Putin. He’s unwittingly seen to it. He’s concentrated power in himself with no heir or recognized second-in-command to take hold the reins. There’s no politburo or royal family to confer even a modicum of legitimacy on a successor. After Putin, a struggle will come, perhaps one to prevent a deluge.
The junta
A dozen or so military, security, and business leaders could find themselves at the top. They will have both unifying and divisive forces. They will be unified by memory of an impetuous, arbitrary, and isolated president, need to do something about the war, suppression of internal opposition, and opposition to liberal groups. A deferent, ultra-nationalist patriarch will provide periodic benedictions.
This junta – a politburo of sorts, though unfettered to a party or ideology – will have support from China. Generals, security leaders, and oligarchs have all worked with China in their respective spheres. And China is eager to maintain a strong, aligned Russia. Without it, the Long March to global power will be extremely difficult. China will be a great economic power but one without an ally stretching from Europe to the East Asia. Beijing’s worst nightmare is Russian rapprochement with the West or triangulation between East and West. It must seek to steer events in Moscow.
The conflicts
Like all juntas, it will have divisions. The war will go on, but in what form? More mobilization and hopes of more favorable attrition ratios? Pause and rebuild? The need for more competent generals to replace the ones Putin groomed is clear, but the new leaders will each have favorites for such powerful positions. Divisions could emerge over concessions to foreign powers for sanctions relief, placating restive domestic consumers, dealing with unruly ethnic and religious minorities, and seeing advantages to balancing between the US and China.
Consensus among generals, oligarchs, and security heads will prove elusive and power will concentrate in one or two figures. That’s what happened in the Bolshevik movement as it planned to seize power and to the communist party after the deaths of Lenin and Stalin.
Imperatives of dangerous times and longstanding national preference for strong rulers will align to make a new autocracy. Uncertainty at the top risks conflict between army factions (including Wagner mercenaries and disgruntled Mobiks), more violence from ethnic and religious minorities, and an indecisive state in time of war.
Regardless of events inside the Kremlin, the war will continue. Admitting failure will spell doom for any government. From the perspective of Kyiv and the West, a divided junta is preferable to a decisive autocrat. The latter poses a potential threat, which will be examined next.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.