Brian M Downing
Putin is facing defeat in Ukraine and that will bring deep turmoil to Russia. He will confront opposition from elites and the public. He may be ousted or he may use his considerable wiles to stay in power. Four scenarios will be looked at in this series: liberal reform, protracted strife, authoritarian reform, and continued rule by Putin.
As much as we might think regime change would necessarily bring improvement, it might not be the case, as will be explored in a later article. The prospects of a liberal outcome will be looked at first.
Defeat and regime change
There are instances of authoritarian rulers losing wars and giving way to democratically-elected leaders. This might hold out the prospect of Putin’s downfall and a new democracy. Germany and Japan in 1945, Argentina after the Falklands War come to mind. However, these countries had previous democratic institutions of some standing, and Japan and most of Germany were occupied by armies of democratic powers.
There are counter-instances too. Military-imperial rule in Germany ended in 1918, ushering in a frail democracy that collapsed only fifteen years later. Defeat ended Romanov autocracy in 1917 and brought liberal government, but it lasted less than a year.
New democracies are weak and face groups determined to overthrow them. Iran tossed out the Pahlavis but hardline mullahs won out over the liberals.
Democracy in Russia
The West sees democracy as desirable, morally superior, and highly functional. (It used to see democracy as inevitable as well but that seems to have given way.) Russians, most of them, do not share that view. They associate democracy with economic downturn, indecision, moral decay, foreign vulnerability, and failure.
Defeat in the Crimean War brought local councils (zemstvos) but their purview was limited and large property holders ran the show. The loss in the Russo-Japanese war led to a duma and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought another. Both failed and communism and Putinism took their places, respectively.
Russians prefer strong authoritarian and often harsh rulers – Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Nicholas I, and Joseph Stalin. Each built national power and greatness by crushing disloyalty at home and conquering foreign lands. Putin sees himself as their successor. Anyone contending for power will do the same.
Authoritarian elites
Most centers of power are disposed to authoritarian rule. Their principals have personal loyalty to Putin. The army, security bureaus, state-owned media, and most in the duma share traditional hostilities toward democracy and the West.
Prosperous business leaders are said to have built democracy in the West. Russian counterparts today, however, manage and benefit greatly from national assets granted them by Putin. Many probably see Putin as foolhardy, arbitrary, and increasingly deranged but a dozen or more of them have met with mysterious fatal accidents, probably done by Putin’s Chekists.
Surviving oligarchs may despise and fear Putin but a democracy poses its own dangers. A liberal government might break up monopolies, demand public accountability, and perhaps even expropriate the expropriators. Seeing no safe havens aboard anymore, the oligarchs will stay with Putin or throw in with an authoritarian successor.
Defeat and the public
The coming outcome in Ukraine will not favor liberal developments. Defeat usually discredits authority and the status quo, as in Germany and Japan. Russia will likely avoid this. The defeat will not entail foreign occupation, hundreds of thousands of liberal young people have fled the country, and the Kremlin will be able to rally nationalist support.
Dismal events in Ukraine are already increasing ultranationalism. The process is likely to intensify as the army faces more casualties and losses of territory, perhaps including Crimea by next year. Events aren’t seen as caused by incompetent and corrupt leaders. They’re more the result of Western machinations to humiliate and weaken Russia. Dissent at home is treasonous, as is the conduct of disloyal generals.
They must be dealt with in the same harsh manner of previous great leaders lest the sacrifice of brave soldiers be in vain. A commentator recently passionately called for a Lavrentia Beria – Stalin’s most successful henchman and mass murderer. This favors Putin or another ultranationalist figure.
A liberal outcome is highly unlikely. It might be glumly noted that this is the only scenario that could lead to meaningful peace with Ukraine. Ultranationalism will continue and intensify, with or without Putin, and the war will drag on, if only at a slower pace, along the lengthy borders.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.